Regional Integration in Africa. The Case of SADC
Inter-state alliances and collaboration exist all over the world and are often referred to as ‘regional integration’ and/or ‘regional co-operation’. More recently the notion of a ‘new regionalism’ was introduced in International Relations theory. This approach is less concerned with states and formal arrangements but tends to emphasise the social reality of an ‘informal economy’, which might transcend the borders of a ‘nationally’ defined territory. While this concept and view offers a certain attraction, it tends to ignore the fact that the state entities remain the exclusive units for organisation and representation. Regional integration schemes have consequently been so far confined to member states, which ratify a common understanding.
Few of the regional schemes, however, suggest a convincing degree of effectiveness. This has not reduced the desire of states to be part of them. Numerous countries are members of several regional schemes, some of them even colliding with each other. Few governments who once joined opt out of schemes (such as more recently Tanzania when terminating its membership in COMESA). Next to matters of prestige, there are pragmatic political reasons for joining such regional collaboration schemes. Motives are not only confined to economic expectations, but also rooted in interests to protect and promote national security and to advocate one’s own policy issues within the regional context. It is a regional component of foreign policy, which at the same time seeks to enhance bargaining power of the regional bloc as an organised interest group in its own right. Evidence of this is the present efforts of Namibia, to gain support first in Southern Africa for the candidacy of its Foreign Minister as next Executive Secretary of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).
The Southern African context
In Southern Africa, Namibia and Swaziland are members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) at the same time. On top of this, they are both also members of the Cross Border Initiative (CBI), transformed in May 2000 into the Regional Investment Facilitation Forum (RIFF). One might wonder if the nationally available capacity ensures efficient representation in all these bodies to maximise gains.
Among external support from within the donor community, assistance to regional integration schemes ranks comparatively high. SADC is said to depend for up to 90 per cent of its funds from sources coming from outside its member countries. The two latest of its 14 members (the DR Congo and the Seychelles) have not paid any membership fees since they were admitted in September 1997. SADC is nevertheless rated among the more promising regional integration schemes in the world and considered to be the most relevant one in Africa. As elsewhere, the Southern African trend towards regionalism was economically and politically motivated. Support to regional integration efforts was based on the assumption that this could be a sensible and practical contribution to development—mainly defined in economic terms. Of late, however, even economists attach less relevance to intra-trade issues or related economic goals, but include political and security issues as a guiding motive for closer collaboration. In the case of SADC, the overall limited potential of the local markets and economies will despite all efforts perpetuate the dominance and priority of the external (world) market in the trade patterns.
Another handicap is the factual hegemony of one state: the South African economy is so markedly more complex than those in the neighbouring countries that synergetic effects based on mutual neighbourly exchange relations are difficult to obtain. The transformation of a previous ‘anti-coalition’ by the then ‘frontline states’, had to meet the challenges of a rather difficult point of departure. Initially organised as SADCC (Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference) and then only transformed into SADC, they ultimately took on board the ‘big brother/sister’, against which they were originally seeking a closer alliance to reduce dependency. The gross economic imbalance is illustrated by the empirical fact that the combined GDP of the other countries in SADC was estimated in 1997 at a little more than USD 51 billion or roughly 40 per cent of South Africa’s GDP. By the late 1990s, the GDP of Zimbabwe as the second biggest economy in SADC, was estimated at less than seven per cent of South Africa’s—and has deteriorated since then dramatically.
Weaker economies will only by means of preferential treatment benefit from regional integration under such skewed circumstances. Substantial measures to strengthen the smaller partners in the network are required. To that extent it was a mixed blessing that the EU initiated a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with South Africa, with direct and far-reaching implications for all SACU (and to a lesser extent SADC) members, without ensuring an adequate process of consultation with all other member states from the beginning. As a result of South Africa’s one-sided negotiations at least during the initial stages, suspicions towards the hegemonic regional power were even further enhanced.
Policy challenges
Successful regional integration schemes require political commitment, confidence building and trust, or at least the ability to seek compromises among the stakeholders to create sustainable common denominators. There has hardly been encouraging evidence in Southern Africa in recent years that there have been meaningful achievements towards more regional unity. The original focus and emphasis on trade patterns has to some extent created the misleading assumption that regional integration would be foremost a matter of economic issues. Even there, however, the rather painstakingly slow process of the ratification of the SADC Trade Protocol has been discouraging. Agreed upon in 1996, it only came into effect at the end of 1999, paving the way for a free trade area in the region in another decade.
Regional peace is an obvious illusion so far. The latest war in Congo provoked a serious rift among SADC states, with direct Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean military involvement since 1998. The intervention by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho before the end of the same year was similarly counterproductive. So is the impact of the deteriorating internal situation of Zimbabwe. Along with the continued conflict in Angola, where Namibia has directly intervened, these are only the most prominent among the sobering signs of unsolved regional security issues. They illustrate as much as the ongoing petty disputes over borders and territories that individual countries place their particular agenda above regional matters. The signing of a defence pact between Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe as a result of the common intervention in the DR Congo, shows the preference for arrangements below the level of regional unity as much as the SA-EU FTA is an indication for preferences above that level. There are at least two camps in SADC, and many particular interests of a more individual nature. Controversies surrounding the autonomy and control of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security since 1996 are just another obvious example of the peculiar blend of both, national policy issues and personality clashes, that hampers closer collaboration on a basis of mutual trust.
Reforms and perspectives
SADC members seem to have realised that there is a certain degree of urgency required if the Southern African region wants to build a positive future within the common framework. Several key issues were tackled at an Extraordinary Summit on 9 March 2001 in Windhoek. On a political level, the message seems to be that the power struggle has at least temporarily been put to rest. An indication of this is the confirmation that the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, so far ‘hijacked’ by Zimbabwe with the backing of Angola and Namibia, is accountable to the Summit and chaired on an annual rotating basis. Furthermore, attempts by the same camp to push for a new SADC Executive Secretary from one of their countries have failed. The acting Executive Secretary from Mauritius was the obvious compromise choice agreed upon. Both decisions can be conducive to more unity and hence stability within the alliance if they reflect a common acceptance beyond strategic manoeuvring.
Relevant structural modifications have been agreed upon with regard to economic policy programmes and their institutionalisation. A marked shift has been decided upon by merging the 19 sectors so far run by individual member states into four clusters. They comprise the following areas: 1) trade, industry, finance and investment; 2) infrastructure and services; 3) food, agriculture and natural resources; and 4) social and human development. Additional special projects should provide space for acting and co-ordinating on issues like disaster management and drug trafficking.
The thus far decentralised, sector-based approach had delegated tasks in SADC to member states with varying degrees of capacity. This had produced very heterogeous results. The cluster approach (with a directorate in charge of each of the four categories) offers the opportunity to bundle and focus regional competence recruited from all SADC states under one roof. This concept implies a strengthening of the hitherto rather weak Secretariat based in Gaborone. The schedule anticipates a phasing out of the existing sectors and commissions within two years and the gradual introduction and final establishment of all four new directorates by 2002. Time will clearly tell, if and to what extent the SADC members are prepared to honour this restructuring process.
Most potential for further sector-related integration, however, continues to lie in the expansion of joint responsibilities and shared utilisation of resources in the power and energy sector. Since this is one of the more strategic commodities, it might become a suitable test case for the future ability to seek common interests and to rank them above the individual desire towards autarky. The same applies to the ability in the regional context to manage water as the most precious natural resource—and the one most likely to provoke future conflicts.
Beyond such practical approaches, however, is a need to define the concept and main concern of a regional strategy. It makes a difference, after all, if the emphasis is on human security or on economic growth. It also needs to be acknowledged that co-operation from state to state requires legitimate governments, which are entitled to act for a common public interest. Such collaboration, furthermore, needs institutional capacity and efficiency as much as transparency and accountability. The present control and exploration of diamond mines (or other natural resources) by different SADC states in other countries of the region without proper accounting seems to be in contrast to such requirements. If interaction of this nature is more the order of the day, the notion of a ‘new regionalism’ might have a stronger case as indicated above. And this would be detrimental for those who support SADC.
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