Whither the Dividends of Democracy in Nigeria?

By: Jibrin Ibrahim, Country Director, International Human Rights Law Group, Abuja, Nigeria

The phrase 'dividends of democracy' was popularised by President Obasanjo himself when he came back to power in 1999 and promised a brighter future for the nation. It should be recalled that Obasanjo who had been a military head of state had voluntarily left power and handed over to an elected civilian government in 1979. He subsequently joined the ranks of those fighting Abacha's military dictatorship and almost paid for it with his life. Finally, Obasanjo had been invited to contest for power in 1999 by Northerners who believed that his unquestionable commitment to national unity would be a major asset in the post-Abacha political healing period. President Obasanjo therefore came to power with an enormous amount of goodwill and in the euphoria of the moment promised Nigerians the dividends of democracy. The question that is posed here is: Are there any gains for the Nigerian people from the democratic transition?

Two years after the promise, the overwhelming impression in the country seems to be that the dividends of democracy have not manifested themselves. Nigerians seem to be disappointed that two years on, there are still too many problems that have not been adequately addressed. People have every right to expect a lot of immediate changes but expectations have to be realistic and the sources of blame correctly identified. A lot of the problems facing the government have their roots in the preceding regime and it will take the country a long time to adequately address them. At the same time, for democratic transition to be meaningful, the government must be able to do certain things that will distinguish it from the erstwhile authoritarian regimes so that democracy becomes meaningful to the people. In examining this question, we shall briefly review three aspects of the dividends of democracy that have generated debate in the countrythe political, the economic and the human rights situation.

Political dividends
The 12 June 1993 presidential election was an important turning point in Nigerian history. It should be recalled that it was annulled mid-way through the announcement of the results, just at the moment when it had become clear that M. K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba politician, had won a landslide victory over Bashir Tofa, a Kano Hausa. Was the election annulled because the Yorubaman was beating the Hausaman at the polls? For many keen observers of Nigerian politics, the truth of the matter was that Babangida, the then Head of State, was a dictator who wanted to rule for as long as possible. The Yoruba elite, and indeed, the Southern elite, were however convinced that the annulment of the 1993 election was a continuation of a Hausa-Fulani plot to perpetually keep them out of power. Indeed, the election was considered to have been relatively free and fair and a good opportunity to start rebuilding confidence in the Nigerian nation-state. The cancellation however led to strong ethnic and regional fears that the Hausa ruling class was not going to allow a Southerner to rule, even if he won a democratic election. The annulment of the election therefore shook confidence in the Nigerian State.

'Power shift' refers to the calls of people from Southern Nigeria that the occupant of Aso Rock, the seat of power, should shift from the North to the South. The 1995 Draft Constitution had stipulated that the Presidency should be rotated between the North and the South, gubernatorial power rotated between the three senatorial districts in each state and the chairmanship of local governments between three zones to be created in each of them. These constitutional proposals were however completely discredited when it became clear that General Abacha had no intention of vacating power. He was planning and plotting to continue as the 'elected President'. Since he was from the North, the implication was that the zoning was therefore going to start from the North, the region that had monopolised power for a long time. The concept of power shift arose therefore to remove the ambiguity associated with zoning and rotation.

The swearing in of President Obasanjo in May 1999 was the realisation of the goal of power shift. A political pact had been worked out by the political class in which Northern politicians, whose constituencies are a numerical majority in the country, agreed not to contest for the Presidency so that a Southerner would emerge as President and political tension in the country would be calmed down. The pact 'allocated' the presidency to the Yoruba of the South West. The two candidates that contested for the Presidency were both Yoruba, and Obasanjo was the winner. And then the problems began. The hardcore Yoruba political elite felt that Obasanjo, although Yoruba, was a Northern candidate who might be subservient to the Northern political machine. They therefore voted en masse for the other Yoruba candidate, Olu Falae who lost. Although Yoruba candidates have been struggling to be elected into this exalted post for forty years, Obasanjo's victory created anger rather than joy in Yorubaland. Ethnic mobilisation and chauvinism intensified and the Yoruba militia organised in the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC) increased its attacks on Nigerians from other ethnic groups living in Yoruba-land. Obasanjo's first year in office was therefore incongruous as the main challenge to his rule was from his own 'ethno-regional' base. That challenge however eased in the second year as his Yoruba associates succeeded in splitting the Yoruba opposition to the government and galvanising significant support for him.

The election of President Obasanjo also increased political anger in other parts of the country. The Igbos in the South East saw the election as another manifestation of the political marginalisation they have been suffering since the commencement of the Nigerian civil war in 1966. The Southern ethnic minorities in the South South zone have been equally unhappy with Obasanjo. The country's national revenue, almost exclusively coming from petroleum exploitation, is obtained from their land. They have therefore found Obasanjo's vehement opposition to their demands for resource control very offensive. In the North, the major political problem for the Obasanjo government has been the introduction of the Shari'a legal system. Given the history of tension and conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, this phenomenon raised a lot of fears. Indeed, in February, and again in June 2000, bloody conflicts between Muslims and Christians occurred in Kaduna, in which thousands of people were killed. The government was at a loss as to how to handle the situation and they have basically adopted a wait and see attitude.

In its first two years, the Obasanjo government encountered more political problems than it bargained for. In spite of that fact, however, the level of tension has declined significantly at this second anniversary of the government, compared to the first one. The activities of ethnic militias, and religious zealots have lessened. The political dividends of power shift have been slow in coming. The tensions that have been persisting are due to problems that have been brewing over a long period. While the government has often appeared overwhelmed by the problems, what is important is that institutional mechanisms for addressing the problems exist and the government is slowly learning how to use them.

Economic dividends
No one expected the numerous problems confronting the Nigerian economy to be resolved within the first two years after Obasanjo's return to power in 1999. Most Nigerians however expected that certain nuts and bolts could be tightened which would ease the terrible conditions of life in the country. Two issues were of particular interest to Nigerians.

The first was the constant absence of petrol from filling stations in a petroleum rich country. There were high expectations that Obasanjo's apparent commitment to the struggle against corruption would lead to an immediate resolution of the problem. And it appeared as if it had. In the first six months of the Administration, fuel queues disappeared from the country. And then, they started coming back gradually, and within a few more months, the country was back to its 'normal' state of petrol and kerosene shortage. While Nigerians were back in the queues struggling to get fuel, the Obasanjo government was busy making the case for an increase in fuel prices, at the insistence of the Bretton Woods Institutions who have been so upset that fuel is 'too cheap' in Nigeria. What they failed to realise was that after two decades of constant decline in the standard of living of the population, reasonably cheap fuel was the last fortress Nigerians had and they were ready to defend it. Nigerians are still at a loss as to why two years into the life of the Obasanjo government, fuel scarcity persists. It is a problem that any serious government should be able to address in two years and this failure is raising grave doubts about the commitment of the government in fixing the nuts and bolts of the economy.

The second problem is that a lot of Nigerians feel the government should have been able to address is that of the epileptic electricity supply in the country. In a way, the government set itself up on the issue. One year after his inauguration, President Obasanjo admitted that the electricity supply company had failed completely in keeping to their targets. The President took over responsibility for it and set up a technical committee under his direct supervision. After two years in power, the government has failed to significantly improve the electricity supply in spite of the 152.8 billion Naira paid out between 1999 and 2001. The result is that Nigerians remain in darkness. Given the implications of the low power supply in the country for economic activity as well as for people's living conditions, it is disturbing that more efforts have not been put into getting results.

Fundamental questions are being posed on the commitment of the government to reversing the tide of economic decline. The government has admitted that its amateurish attempt to increase employment through providing monthly emoluments to ruling party faithfuls has failed. The campaign they launched to justify the increase in fuel prices collapsed. The policy of abandoning the pursuit of social welfare and the privatisation of virtually all services has caused much consternation. More ominously, the confidence the government has placed on international financial institutions rather than its own people creates doubts as to their commitment to economic development. The question people are asking the government is the following: Does globalisation mean complete capitulation to the whims and caprices of the West?

Human rights
During the first year of the government, two gruesome incidents of gross human rights violations were reported to have occurred. The first was the massacre of the inhabitants of Odi and the destruction of the town following the killing of some policemen in the vicinity. The second was the gang raping of a number of women in Choba by members of the security forces. The incidents were however isolated and the human rights condition in the country has clearly improved. Police roadblocks have been removed. Soldiers have returned to their barracks. State terrorism has subsided. The surveillance and harassment of the public by the dreaded State Security Service have been toned down. Actually, it is easy to demonstrate that there are indeed democracy dividends that are being reaped in Nigeria today. This achievement is easy to record. The level of repression, state terrorism, corruption, ethno-regional discrimination and de-institutionalisation of the polity under the Abacha regime was so high that almost any government cannot but be better. The real question that is posed is that of hope for the deepening of democracy in the country. Democracy is never a static situation but a dynamic process in which there is movement between the expansive and repressive ends of the continuum depending on the relative strength of the forces at play. Clearly, the forces of democracy are on the ascendancy so there is hope in the country.

The Presidency has tried to impose its might on the National Assembly but the parliamentarians have been able to resist and the country today can boast of the most independent National Assembly in its history. Civil society remains very active and vigilant and is able to constructively engage with the government. The military and security forces have so far kept to their promise of not interfering with the political process. In spite of the numerous problems facing the country, the possibilities for the construction of democracy remain high. Democracy offers social groups an opportunity to defend social gains by having a say on how broad decisions are made and by providing a framework for rules and institutions to be periodically tested and upgraded without resorting to violence. The possibility of institution building is higher under democratic rule than under conditions of authoritarianism. At the end of the day, the greatest dividend of democracy is the possibility for the expansion of political freedom, political participation and institution building. As we reflect on two years of the return of democracy to Nigeria, much as serious problems continue to confront the polity, there is still some room for optimism.

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