Can Sanctions Work? The Case of Angola

By: Anders Möllander , Ambassador, Head of South Africa Group, Africa Department, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

The war in Angola is one of Africa's most long-standing violent conflicts. After the war of liberation against Portuguese colonialism ended in 1974, the three rebel movements failed to agree on the governance of the country. An internal war ensued between MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), backed by the Soviet bloc and Cuba, and FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), backed by China, USA and apartheid South Africa. After the end of the cold war, an agreement was reached in Bicesse in Portugal in 1991 between the main parties. The agreement led to multiparty elections in 1992. UNITA, however, resumed the war after the elections. The Security Council decided on a comprehensive regime of sanction measures directed against UNITA's war effort, beginning in 1993.

In the following, efforts to strengthen the implementation of the sanctions regime against UNITA will be described. It will be argued that these efforts have had important effects, both in relation to UNITA's war effort and to the respect for UN Security Council decisions on sanctions and, indeed, for the UN in general. It will further be argued that so called "smart sanctions" without negative humanitarian effects, can be made to work. Methods to achieve this will be described.

Prior to 1999 the general feeling about sanctions against Angola in the corridors of the UN high-rise in New York was one of malaise. The rebel movement UNITA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi had resumed waging war after the elections in 1992. The Security Council had reacted with unanimous decisions on sanctions directed against the war effort of UNITA to try to bring it back to the democratic, political process. In 1993 sanctions related to the procurement of arms, military equipment and fuel were adopted. Following the signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994, an uneasy peace ensued. However, UNITA's failure to comply with its obligations under the protocol soon prompted the Security Council to threaten and then, in 1997, to impose additional sanctions. These included freezing of bank accounts, prohibition of travel by senior officials and closing of UNITA offices abroad. In 1998 the purchase of diamonds from UNITA controlled territory was prohibited.

The malaise felt in New York related to the apparent impunity with which UNITA was able to circumvent the sanctions regime. Apart from encouraging the movement to continue its war effort, the lack of follow-up reflected badly on the ability of the Security Council, the UN secretariat and, indeed, the international community to enforce its decisions. This was especially so as the decisions of the council had been taken with reference to the situation as a threat to international peace and security. Continued and increasing human suffering in Angola as a result of the war underlined the urgency of the situation.

Canada had in January 1999 taken over the responsibility in the Security Council for chairing the Sanctions Committee on Angola and the Canadian UN envoy, Ambassador Robert Fowler, embarked on an ambitious consultation and fact-finding mission which resulted in two reports to the council. The reports contained a total of 19 recommendations aimed at strengthening the implementation of the decisions taken by the council.

Panel of experts
In February 1999 the council supported a recommendation that there should be studies "to trace violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds". In May a panel of experts was established under my chairmanship to carry out this task. The panel consisted of ten international experts and was given a six months' mandate.

Common wisdom at the time was that little could be expected of the panel's work. It was considered next to impossible to establish how weapons were bought and brought into the conflict area and equally, if not more, difficult to ascertain how diamonds were exported to finance arms purchases. As it turned out, the panel was able to report with some detail on these matters. We were greatly helped by the fact that the government of Angola during the latter half of 1999 managed to oust UNITA's forces from their strongholds Andulo and Bailundo on the Angolan High Plateau. Defectors were coming over to the government side, and some soldiers were captured. These, as well as some captured material, were eventually made available to the panel and were useful in corroborating information received from other sources.

Through interviews with some key officers who had left Savimbi and through discussion with experts in the field, the panel was able to piece together a picture of the diamonds-for-arms business of the movement. The panel could thus in its report of 10 March 2000 (S/2000/203) present a credible account of how UNITA had procured arms and military material. It had apparently worked mainly through international brokers who were supplied with end-user certificates acquired from friendly governments, notably Togo and Burkina Faso in West Africa, which also gave refuge to UNITA officials and their families. In exchange, the heads of state in these countries received diamonds and funds.

The arms brokers had apparently mainly procured arms in or through Bulgaria. The government of Bulgaria decided to co-operate with the panel in investigating the deals.

The diamonds were mined in areas controlled by UNITA using local labour or workers brought from neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). The diamonds were used mainly to pay for the purchase of arms and other goods. Diamond brokers would be engaged to evaluate packages needed for the purchases of goods. A major operator of cargo flights in African countries was identified as the main transporter of goods to UNITA territory.

Results and follow-up
As a result of the work of the panel it appears that the culture of impunity has been broken. Many reports point to the fact that it has been made more difficult and less profitable for UNITA to sell its diamonds and more difficult and costly to acquire arms. A follow-up mechanism has been working on leads established but not fully investigated by the panel (Reports: S/2000/1225 and S/2001/363). The mechanism's findings have corroborated those of the panel. Other panels have followed in the footsteps of the Angola-panel, notably on Sierra Leone and the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo, where illegal exploitation of natural resources is also funding the activities of rebel groups. An international diamond certification scheme is being prepared by an international working group called after its first meeting place in South Africa, the Kimberley group. The work of the group is based on a resolution in the UN General Assembly. It aims at identifying diamonds legally mined and exported, through a system of certification and controls, thus isolating illegal export and import of diamonds.

A discussion is taking place at the UN in New York on the strengthening of the capacity of the council and the secretariat to follow up on the council's decisions on sanctions. It should finally be noted that the design of the sanctions regime against UNITA has not been questioned during the process and that the sanctions, and efforts to render them more effective, continue to enjoy unanimous support within the Council. The sanctions are clearly defined to target the military capacity of UNITA under Jonas Savimbi and are largely without negative humanitarian effects. Humanitarian aid to victims of the war has thus not been affected by the sanctions decisions or their implementation.

Conclusion
The effect of the work of the panel of experts has thus been inter alia increased awareness of the sanctions regime directed against the war effort of UNITA in Angola. It has apparently also affected UNITA's capacity to continue the war. At the same time, it has contributed to the strengthening of the capacity of the UN to also follow up other decisions by the Security Council on sanctions. The methods usedpanel of experts which reports to the sanctions committee, 'naming and shaming', and follow-up through a so called follow-up mechanismhave already been widely copied to good effect. The discussion on the design of sanctions regimes has been influenced by the Angola case. 'Smart sanctions' is becoming a recognized and applied discipline.

To try to end the war in Angola and to alleviate the long-standing suffering of the Angolan population has long been an imperative for the UN and for most of its member states, including Sweden. For someone who has visited, as I did in 1993, two cities, Malanje and Kuito, which had then been recently besieged, and seen aid-workers having to sort starving children into possible survivors and hopeless cases, the motivation to work towards these ends is strong.