Chad – from Civil Strife and Electoral Fraud to Petro-Dictatorship?

Historical Background
Before colonialisation, non-centralist societies in the south co-existed with Islamic kingdoms in the sahelian zone. The French-British convention of 1899 drew up the borders in the west and east, and Chad became a French colony in 1920. In the north, a French–Italian agreement came into operation in 1936. In spite of all this the nomads continued their traditional migration.

The colonial borders have locked together some 200 ethnic groups, with over 100 different languages, where the dominant groups (Arabs 15 percent in the north, Sara 20 percent in the south) represent only a small proportion of the total population. The state encompasses both desert nomads, used to a non-state organisation, and sedentary agricultural popula-tions.

Chad possesses few agricultural and mineral resources. The northern Aozou strip contested by Libya does not contain uranium (as it had been reported), and the petrol around Lake Chad and in the southern Western Dogon province is only competitive at a price of 20 USD a barrel. Chad possesses a rudimental infrastructure with only 250 kms of tarred roads, most of them around the capital.

Divide and rule has characterised the politics of Chad ever since independence and led to an almost continuous civil war. When the first president Tombalbaye spoke of ‘Chadisa-tion’ of political life, he primarily meant his own ethnic group, the Sara. Similarly when advisers of the Islamic National Front, close to the present president Déby, seek to create a society based on sharia laws, this would particularly hurt non-Muslims i.e. 50 percent of the population. No takeover of political power (Habré in 1982 against Libyan influence, or Déby in 1990 against the Habré dictatorship) has so far created a sustainable national unity or managed to stop the civil war. Political power in independent Chad has been systematically used in accordance with an authoritarian and clientelistic conception for the benefit of the leader’s clan and not as an instrument for collective redistribution of resources.

The current crisis started three years after independence, in 1963, when Tombalbaye was installed. All opposition was prohibited, which provoked a rebellion. It has been the same under Habré and Déby—the benefits of power were restricted to the members of the president’s clan and the resources of the state were systematically eroded, which led to unpaid civil servants, corruption and repression of oppressed ethnic groups (today the Sara in the south). Slowly, rebellions developed and the social base of the regime was weakened, which forced it to use repression to maintain its hold on power. The civil population suffered the most with 40,000 dead during the Habré regime. The rebel movement became stronger and with only 2,000 soldiers Déby overthrew Habré. Youssof Togoimi, an ex-minister who also wants to seize presidential power, is at present leading a rebellion in the Tibesti mountains. The new government, which bases its legitimacy on its military victory, has promised ‘national reconciliation’ and a ‘national unity’ government. Gradually, the initial consensus is giving way to the president’s growing authoritarism, as he refuses to share the benefits of power. Assassinating members of the opposition has become part of the governance system. The internationalisation of the clan conflicts can take place at any moment when each of the factions seeks foreign support according to its need for cash, arms, religious or political support. France and Libya have always been ready to involve themselves in the internal feuds of Chad by training of, and paying salaries to, civil servants and parts of the military. The source of conflict is the control of state resources. None of the rebel leaders has so far had a political agenda in the interest of the population at large.

Déby re-elected
Idriss Déby, a former air force pilot from Fada in the northeast, has, since he overthrew the former President and dictator Hissene Habré in 1990, initiated a democratic transition after a National Conference in 1993 and introduced a ‘controlled’ multi-party system which today has 50 different parties. He was first elected in 1996 for a five-year period. Déby has gradually been transformed from a military man to a politician. He was re-elected in May 2001 in a resounding victory.

Is the former rebel leader Idriss Déby going to introduce a ‘petro-dictatorship’? The question is justified after what, according to Le Monde (30 May 2001) is the greatest case of election rigging in Francophone Africa since the transition to multi-party democracy started in 1990. Déby was already declared the winner after the first round of voting, with two thirds of all the votes. The main opponent, ‘the federalist’ Yorongar obtained 14 percent, while the elderly Kamougué, the president of the Parliament, who forced Déby to a second round in 1996, only received five percent of the votes.

Voter turn-out was high: 80.9 percent. International observers, visiting only 250 out of 6,800 polling stations, noted that the voting went smoothly but did not give comments on the voter registration. The six opposition candidates protested against cheating to the Constitution Court, which however declared Déby the winner although it cancelled 500,000 votes, thereby admitting that some of the complaints were justified.

In his installation speech in the presence of seven African heads of state, Déby admitted that the voting lists needed to be amended before the next election to the National Assembly in 2002 to take into consideration the “errors in the last population census”. Out of 35 ministerial posts in the new government 20 (Interior, Defence, Finance etc) went to Déby’s party, Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS), while Foreign Affairs was offered to Parti pour les Libertés et le Développement (PLD).

President Déby felt threatened by Yoron-gar, who leads a ‘federalist’ party, Fédération Action pour la République (FAR), from the south. People there often believe that ‘federation’ means that there will be no need to share the future oil incomes with the population in the north. Both Déby and Yorongar assisted the former dictator Hissene Habré when he took power in 1982, and both were also involved in overthrowing him in 1990. Yorongar has accused Déby of being responsible for massacres and drug smuggling. Habré himself is accused of genocide. He lives in exile in Senegal.

The re-elected president made a strong push in the Christian south, a traditional stronghold of the opposition. The distrust since the civil war between the ethno-religious groups has not fully disappeared. The regionalist voting is mainly seen in the case of Yorongar, the only candidate advocating a federalist solution.

Many people from the south hope to benefit greatly from the oil exploitation, but a part of the electorate has supported Déby, which shows that the idea of national unity exists. All the other candidates failed to obtain support, partly because they have all at some time collaborated with the Déby regime.

Distribution of oil incomes
The political importance of the oil project cannot be emphasised enough. With a democratic government, a remarkable improvement of living conditions for the poor population could be achieved, but there is also an obvious risk that the increased state revenues would be used to create even bigger injustices and violence.

Oil prospecting in Chad had already started in the 1960s, but it was only in 1973 that an American company found oil. The exploitation was delayed until 1993 by the civil war. In 1999 Shell and Elf withdrew because of political and ecological risks. Exxon-Mobil, Petro-nas and Chevron, which required a guarantee from the World Bank against political risks, created a new consortium. In October 2000, construction of pipelines and drilling of the first of the planned 300 wells started.

The oil issue has mobilised local and foreign political actors, as well as local and international NGOs, which have questioned the World Bank’s involvement on ecological grounds. In 1999 NGOs called for a two-year moratorium on the project. Disputes have appeared between those who desired to improve the project and others who only wanted to delay the start. The Déby government, accepting proposals for improvement, in particular on the environment issues, has demonstrated a strong political will to implement the oil project. The oil resource might represent a unique opportunity for a poor country like Chad to finance development with its own resources at a time of diminishing foreign aid.

As a result of international fears about possible abuse of future oil incomes, in 1999 the National Assembly adopted a unique and innovative law, concerning a transparent reporting of the oil incomes. The law leaves the management and distribution of the resources to a special Management and Control Body with representatives from the government, the civil society and the financing institutions such as BEAC (Central Bank of Central African States). The distribution of future state revenues should follow the formula of 80 percent to four priority sectors within rural development, (agriculture, livestock, water resources and environment), 10 percent to future generations and the rest for free expenditure.

The total investment costs are calculated at 3,700 million USD, which would allow a production of 225,000 barrels a day for 30 years. About 80 percent of the investment will come from the private consortium. The present estimate gives a reserve of 1,000 million barrels. The World Bank finally decided in June 2000 to allocate 300 million USD to construct a 1,070 km underground pipeline, of which 200 million came from its private sector affiliate, the International Finance Cooperation. The Bank talks about a unique co-operation and “how a partnership and commitment between governments, transnational companies, financing institutions and the local population can be of benefit for all”. The Bank project includes environmental management plans and a resettlement and compensation plan for the local populations affected by the project. The decision has been criticized for being based on assessments by environment experts close to the companies, but many improvements have been made.

The state is expected to receive an annual tax revenue of 120 million USD, more than twice what it is today. A socio-economic study shows a total benefit for the society between 2,500 and 8,500 million USD, including incomes from locally employed staff and local procurement. More than 4,000 persons will be employed during the construction of the pipeline and 200 will be offered permanent employment during the exploitation phase.

Future perspective
President Déby can be expected to establish a personal dictatorship by paying off the opposition, especially as the oil income will give a greater space for manoeuvre. There is also a risk that he will become isolated within his minority ethnic group Zaghaza, which dominates his bodyguard and might request him to stay in power even after 2006, something that would be incompatible with the constitution. In the election to the National Assembly in 2002, Déby needs a landslide victory in order to change the constitution. This would certainly upset international opinion, especially as Déby is accused in France of smuggling falsified dinar-notes and as human rights organisations are trying to take Habré to court on the charge of genocide. These organisations believe that if they succeed in bringing Habré to trial, Déby would also be involved as the one responsible for massacres in 1984.

How important would Déby’s political support have been without inflating the number of registered voters in the north and rigging the election outcome from many polling stations? The legal opposition is now forced to accept the outcome, but at the same time there is a risk that the rebellion, which was started in 1998 in the Tibesti Mountains by a former defence minister, will spread and receive increased support after Déby’s re-election. Déby was already forced in 2000 to use part of the pre-paid oil bonus to buy arms. Will he obtain sufficient income from the oil in time to calm the general discontent and undermine the opposition? Despite movement toward democratic reform, power remains in the hands of a northern ethnic oligarchy.

Literature on Chad

Azevedo, Mario and Emmanuel U. Nnadozie, Chad: a nation in search of its future. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998.

Azevedo, Mario, Roots of violence: a history of war in Chad. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1998.

Bonnet, Bernard, Shared management of common resources: strengthening local skills. International Institute for Environment and Development. Drylands Programme, 2000. Issue paper, no. 94.

Buijtenhuijs, Robert, Transition et élections au Tchad 1993–1997: Restauration autoritaire et recomposition politique. Paris: Karthala, 1998.

Hardy, Benjamin H., What can oil do for troubled Chad? Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994. CSIS Africa notes no. 159.

May, Roy, “Two steps forward, one step back: Chad’s protracted ‘transition to democracy’”. In Journal of contemporary African studies, vol. 18, no. 1, 2000.

Ministère de la promotion économique et du développement. Direction de la planification du développement, Etat de la population du Tchad en 1999: Croissance démographique et, N’Djaména, 2000.

Ministère des finances et de l’économie, Evaluation du programme triennal appuyé par la facilité d’ajustement structurel renforcée (FASR) 1995-1998: finances publiques. N’Djaména, 1999.

Nebardoum, Derlemari, Le labyrinthe de l'instabi-lité politique au Tchad. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998.

Présidence de la République. Haut comité inter-ministériel, Rapport d’évaluation du premier programme triennal appuyé par la facilité d’ajustement structurel renforcée: du 14 au 15 juin 1999. N’Djaména, 1999.

“Tchad, ‘conflit Nord-Sud’ mythe ou réalité?” Colloque du Centre culturel Al-Mouna à N’Djaména. (Clamecy), Sépia, 1996.

Verschave, François-Xavier and Laurent Beccari, Noir process: offense à chefs d’Etat. Paris, Arènes, 2001.

Internet links
Energy Intelligence Agency, USA: www.eia.doe.gov

Exxon oil project documents: www.esso.com/eaff/essochad

Tchad Government web site: www.yaltchad.com/sodt

World Bank, Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline project: www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj