Morocco Today: Dynamics of Political Change

By: Abouhani Abdelghani, Professor, Institut National d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme, Rabat, Morocco

The elections of 27 September 2002 have not resulted in any major changes in Moroccan political life. The large traditional parties maintain their positions. The only important change is the considerable advancement of the moderate Islamists (Parti de la justice et du développe-ment), which increased their numbers of seats in the parliament from ten to 40. However, they do not have a chance to modify the political game based on an alliance between the monarchy and the parties originating from the independence movement, which are in the majority in parliament. The new government is composed of the same parties, the only exception is the nomination of a prime minister from another party. The Islamist party is still in opposition.

Background
Morocco is one of the best examples to use when analysing future prospects for the experience of national construction in the Arabo-African region. In the Maghreb in general, and in Morocco in particular, the end of the Cold War inaugurated a period of doubt and self-examination: the crisis in the model of development, the aging of the nationalist elite, the rise of the masses and their presence on the political scene were all contributory factors. At the close of the century, a series of riots seemed to indicate a rise in the level of insecurity and posed the question of whether or not the country was really capable of embarking on a peaceful transition which would witness the reconciliation of democracy and development and their mutual reinforcement.

In the 1980s, the emergence of civil society took the form of violent uprisings triggered off by the worsening of social inequalities and sustained by political struggles fueled by attempts to break away from the old political system. Both the political and the economic model seemed to be sinking into chronic instability.

The period from 1960 to 2000 did, however, define a phase in the history of Morocco which witnessed the emergence, the consolidation and the collapse of a model for economic and political development based on the central role of the state both at the level of the distribution of political roles and of the allocation of economic resources. The centralizing state wished at the same time to create the means of production and to establish the nature of the process of accumulation. Nevertheless, this state capitalism worked largely to the advantage of the private sector, by entrusting it with markets, supplying it with raw materials, giving it credits at reduced rates and sheltering it from foreign competition by protective legal codes. In the political sphere, the state applied itself to controlling the political struggle so as to guarantee to private capital the availability of a cheap and docile labour force. The divisions in the opposition political parties to a great extent assisted the state’s endeavours which were constantly being reinforced, particularly in the 1980s. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s with the reduction in the state’s capacity for redistribution, the extension of the human rights movement, and the violent and repeated eruption of the masses into the political sphere, that we began to see the emergence of the beginnings of political recom-position. However, the basis on which political power is exercised in Morocco has not been successfully challenged.

Recent developments in Morocco have revealed a number of significant trends which will probably interfere with the future development of the country: liberalization, democratization, the risk of Islamic fundamentalism and the sudden emergence of the masses on the political stage.

The liberal scenario
The liberal vision has come up against its own limits. Its implementation has brought in its wake a worsening in the structural imbalance: the external debt has assumed proportions which exceed the financial resources of the country and population growth is far beyond the country’s capacities. The structural adjustment imposed by the IMF has only further reinforced these imbalances. Nevertheless, despite its limits, the liberal vision continues to be presented by the government and its allies as the one and only ultimate aim, which cannot be overruled. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe contributed further to reinforcing the position of those in favour of the sole alternative.

The liberal scenario is based on belief in the capacity of the government in power to manage any future imbalances, to ‘adjust’ the ‘adjustments’, as it did in the 1980s, and to control the social transformations implied by the ‘liberal cure’. The power game among elites is therefore likely to continue with approaches being made to the new political forces, in particular the Soussis whose economic success ought to be rewarded politically.

The durability of the liberal scenario is based on the continuity of the alliances among six strategic groups: the monarchy, the bureaucracy, the army, the Fassis, the Soussis and well-known people in urban and rural areas. This coalition of forces periodically makes a few concessions to the middle class to involve it in the success of a policy of austerity which targets the greatest number: this is how the present process of democratization should be interpreted. The liberal scenario also bases its durability on the continuity of the alliance between the government and the West. This alliance has always been considered as a strategic choice, a pillar of the stability of the Moroccan political system, from which comes the image which is often used by the Head of State in which Morocco is depicted as a tree with its roots deep in Africa and its foliage in Europe.
It is true that to date the bulk of Morocco’s foreign trade is done with the EU and that the understanding of the West has enabled a much less rigorous application of the policy of structural adjustment. Moreover, important parts of the adjustment package have not yet been applied: the privatization of the public sector is still being deferred and the payment of the debt has been put off from one settlement date to the next.
The liberal scenario relies on the continuation of this complicity with the West. Because of its geographical situation, its demographic importance and the resources of its fishing industry, Morocco will continue to be supported by the EU. We should also bear in mind that exploratory discussions have been started with the EU to establish a free trade area which would offer new financial transfers and open up new possibilities for development.

The supporters of the liberal scenario consider that because of its geostrategical position, the West will always adapt its principles, in Morocco, to suit an authoritarian political regime which makes a few democratic concessions to the middle class, but which deals severely with outbursts from the underprivileged in the streets. In the liberal scenario, the urban riots are considered to be mere ‘passing social emotions’, devoid of any social project or political function, which are in no way a threat to the stability of the political system. The urban social movements, even when violent, are not seen to constitute an imminent and urgent threat. Although by definition, riots are a form of resistance and negation, the urban masses are seen as quite incapable of organization and unity and of triggering off an attack on central government.

The risk of Islamic fundamentalism
The risk of ‘fundamentalism’ is much more serious since this movement has at its disposal a total ideology, a model—which is Iran—for guerilla techniques which have been tried out in Algeria, bases for support and training and fairly widespread networks of cooperation. The fundamentalists had already come to the attention of the public in the 1984 and 1990 riots and during the trials of their members. Nevertheless they are for the time being less active than in the rest of the Maghreb. The status of the Head of State, who is at the same time a Prince (chérif), a descendant of the Prophet and the spiritual leader of the believers, coupled with the strong structuring of the clerical hierarchy since 1956, have enabled the authorities to ensure total control of the religious sphere.

But the fundamentalists rely on the multiplicity of factors which are destabilising the system to assert themselves as an alternative to the liberal option. Their subversive ideology, and the attraction which it exerts on the marginalised urban masses turn the ‘fundamentalists’ into a potential threat capable of becoming a political reality in times of crisis.

Is the future of the country confined between the liberal scenario and the risk of fundamentalism, an alternating between political authoritarianism, economic liberalism, popular uprisings and religious fascism? Are there other possible alternatives? In addition these two scenarios could merge and a fundamentalist administration of the liberal economic order is a variation which cannot be excluded.

The democratic scenario
This scenario has acquired a degree of substance since the beginning of the 1990s following the large-scale riots which shook the country and after international pressure to democratize the regime. Negotiations were initiated between the government and the opposition parties and were to deal with two essential points, namely: constitutional reform and the organization of free and transparent elections. The aim was to set up institutional mechanisms to successfully carry through a peaceful transition to democracy. The negotiations between the government and the opposition parties turned out to be extremely difficult and complex. This is what explains their spread over time. They only came to a conclusion with concrete results at the end of the 1990s. But this period was used advantageously by the political actors to prepare the ‘changeover’.

On the side of the opposition, the four main parties grouped together to form the Front Démocratique. They worked out a programme for the reform of the political system in Morocco and a programme for government. The opposition decided in favour of a democratic, constitutional monarchy in which the King arbitrates and does not govern, and a socially orientated liberal economy.

On the government side, efforts have been made to reassure the opposition by declaring an amnesty which allowed the release of all political prisoners, by enlarging the sphere of public liberties (suspension of censorship of the press, lifting of police control over the meetings and activities of political parties, trade unions and associations). The crowning achievement of this process of political reform was the 1996 Constitution which restated Morocco’s belief in human rights and which, above all, extended the powers of the Prime Minister.

This process of reform which was spread over a period of eight years (1990–1997) laid the foundation for an agreement between the power of the monarchy and the opposition. It was on the basis of this agreement that in 1998 the first change of government took place, ending forty years of confrontation between the monarchy and the opposition parties, giving rise to enormous hope for change amongst the underprivileged categories of the population.