By: Lovemore Chipungu, Department of Rural and Urban Planning, University of Zimbabwe
Policy is politics, and politics is power. The power of the modern state is derived in part from its capacity to direct and control production systems. But this power in Zimbabwe, like in many other former colonial countries, has since Independence still been entrenched in the hands of the minority—the former colonial masters. The need to correct this imbalance has seen the ZANU PF government taking fundamental steps through policy measures. The political party became the major source of national policies. These policies are proposed at special party congresses. When such policies are initiated, they are dramatized to produce a sense of urgency. In 1984, the ZANU PF congress emphasised that the party directed the government and not vice versa. The first policy articulation of these views was through the Prime Minister’s directive of 1984, which outlined decentralisation of development structures from the village level to the provincial level. Similarly, the current land reform was initiated at high party levels and used as a campaign tool during the run-up to the presidential elections in March 2002. Over 90 percent of the policy-makers are members of the ruling party. Thus policy-making is largely party-centred with small closed elites making decisions with little consultation. Even the bureaucrats in the party do not have the influence to make the political leadership conscious of the need for alternative policies.
Top-down policy design
Another common feature of policy formulation is that policies at times begin as directives from ministers. Such policies tend to be beyond public criticism. Ironically, those in authority will always defend their decisions in the name of public interest despite the fact that all avenues for the public to air their views will be closed. At a meeting held by the Association of Urban Councils, the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing emphasised that “the government will not remove directives” since it aims to protect public interest (The Herald, 06/06/02). Normally, such policies are ‘revolutionary’ in nature since their aim is to bring immediate change. It is this characteristic feature that is called ‘motivation outruns understanding’ since no time is taken to understand how other factors would contribute to the operation of that policy. They are articulated in such a way as to institute urgency in their implementation. The directive to rename schools in order to remove colonial names is a good example of such policies. The directive was announced in mid-2001 and it was expected that by December 2001 the implementation should be completed. Unfortunately, such policies undermine and disregard the needs of the very institutions charged with that responsibility because the focus is on ‘change now’. Yet systematic parameters through which that policy should be implemented are not clearly defined.
A multi-stakeholder society requires a participatory forum for policy development. But the current institutional design and political culture seems to undermine the existence of such a platform. A multi-stakeholder society must argue on policy principles. But unfortunately for Zimbabwe, consultation is at its lowest ebb. Ironically, there are well-developed institutions through which consensus-building can be achieved, such as the National Economic Consultative Forum (which brings together business people, the labour movement and government). But these institutions have been reduced to ‘talk shops’. There is very little consultation and consensus among stakehold-ers. The policy design process tends to be top down. This explains why most policies lack collective national ownership. Commenting on the government’s policy of renaming schools, the Permanent Secretary of Education, Sports and Culture argued that with some policies, “you just proceed, otherwise you do not change anything because you do not expect to get 100 percent consensus” (Vasity Times, June 2002).
Lack of consultation on major policy issues is not a new phenomenon to Zimbabwe. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was simply announced without prior debate and consultation. Hence policies that emanate as directives are vague and unclear because they are ‘half-baked’. Recently a Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe official, in confirmation of this view, labelled the government’s new funding policy for tertiary education as “characterised by mystery and confusion” largely because little was done to inform the beneficiaries on the implementation of the policy (Vasity Times, June 2002).
The economy of affection
Perhaps the worst development in the formulation and implementation of policy in Zimbabwe is the extent to which politics has been allowed to filter from the political institutions (via ministers) to the bureaucratic organs of the government. This is simply because the policy making machinery is highly politicized and tilted towards one political party. It is quite an inevitable situation since the extreme powers of the executive president allow him to appoint ministers, 30 members of parliament, members of various commissions, judges, executive heads of ministries and ambassadors. These are the very people who participate in policy formulation as part of the ruling elite. Some political commentators have argued these are in essence political appointees who are elected to safeguard party supremacy. There is no objection to the civil service being controlled by politicians since they are supposed to carry out the policies of the duly elected representatives of the people. But if civil servants’ perception of politics develops beyond the rational and professional framework, then they become sycophants. The development of the “economy of affection” and its associated political spoils are gradually encouraging politicisation of the public service. Hence in as much as the policies are at times highly politicised, so is the implementation process. This normally results in misrepresentation of facts as policy makers and implementers try to appease those in high office.
The struggle for good governance
The emerging picture from this discourse is that there is too much political interference in administration and in the assignment of responsibilities. This was summarized by a UNDP and UNCTAD report in 1999, which noted “the capacity in the public sector is constrained by political interference. This political interference is such that in certain cases when the bureaucrats have formulated policies guided by economic implications... politicians put aside such policy changes simply on the basis of political expediency.” This in turn has greatly affected governance. The observation that the generation after independence in Africa is struggling to establish good governance is also very true of Zimbabwe.
The need to accommodate new policies and to coerce people to accept them has been backed by the inauguration of new laws. While it is the norm that new policies should be protected by laws, it is also imperative to allow people to respond to such policies. Where laws enacted tend to curb people’s response to certain policies, there is infringement on the people’s rights to air their views. It is common knowledge that when people’s approved avenues to voice their views are closed, they might resort to mass action (such as peaceful demonstrations). Unfortunately, new legislations in Zimbabwe make it an offence even to criticise an official who holds public office while “unnecessary” gatherings of more than ten people are also illegal (as espoused in the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and the Public Order and Security Act, 2002). These new laws contradict Section 21 of the Constitution that enshrines freedom of assembly and association. That freedom is now only granted to certain members of the society. Some social analysts argue that this is always the case when governments come up with “quick fix policies that are divorced from economic and human rights fundamentals” (Mudzimu in The Financial Gazette, 23 June 2002).
Accountability and transparency are key issues in the pursuance of good governance. Accountability is about keeping promises and public trust. The current policies that are being enacted by the Zimbabwean government have been labelled by some commentators as “political gimmicks and facades”. Because of that element of lack of acceptance, they are seen as creating the basis for poor governance. Chinyama (in The Financial Gazette, 20 June 2002) observed that the government’s excessive intervention has resulted in the adoption of “preferential schemes such as restrictions on foreign exchange, trade and price controls. These offer tempting opportunities to officials to use whatever discretion they have to elicit bribes or kickbacks from those who would benefit from preferential treatment.” For example, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (Noczim) lost Z$ 1.4 billion through corruption. Even President Mugabe admitted a connection between corruption and inefficiency in some parastatals (The Herald, 28 December 2000).
One of the fundamental tasks of modern governments is to maintain international recognition. According to the Zimbabwe Human Development Report by UNDP in 2000, global governance is about how individual countries interact with each other through economic, political and financial institutions. Such recognition will only occur if national policies are acceptable to the international community. The Zimbabwean government, in contrast, is facing immense pressure from the international community because of the current crisis in governance and democracy .
This article is a shorted version of a paper presented to the conference ‘(Re-) Conceptualising Democracy and Liberation in Southern Africa’, which was organized in July 2002 by the Nordic Africa Institute in collaboration with local partners in Windhoek, Namibia (see the report in News no. 3/2002).
Selected topical literature
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UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, Zimbabwe. Harare, 2000.
UNDP and UNCTAD, Human Development Report 1999. New York, 1999