Confronting the challenges of leadership
By: Carlos Lopes, (PhD in history) UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative in Brazil.
In a book recently published by Thomas Theisohn and myself (Ownership, Leadership and Transformation. Can we do better for Capacity development?, New York/London: UNDP/Earth-scan, 2003) we make the case for a renewed interest on the links between ownership, leadership and the perennial dilemmas of capacity development. Today there is a rich body of literature on capacity development. A difficulty remains, however, on how to pin down what it actually implies in practical terms. Our definition is quite simple: it is the ability of people, institutions and society – the three layers involved in capacity development – to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives.
There are several ways capacity can be developed and sustained. But in general they are all premised in a sense of ownership and the existence of transformative leadership. We believe an owner is not necessarily a leader, who must possess certain skills, personal commitment and the ability to carry out concrete action. From the highest national authorities to those at community levels, leaders are most effective when they are inclusive and proactive, and ensure allocation of adequate domestic resources. Leaders make transformation happen when they have the courage to take risks, expand implementation, overcome obstacles and empower others.
It is common sense to say there are no leaders without followers. The real issue is how we define a leader. Is it someone who has personal ambitious goals detached from the common public good? Certainly there are such leaders in abundance. Hence the need for transformation became central to the call for a leadership. That is the element that distinguishes an autocrat of egocentric personality with public appeal or following from engaged visionaries and individuals capable of mobilizing for the common good.
An interesting way to engage in this debate is to remember Antonio Gramsci’s proposals on the role of the organic intellectual. The premises presented by Gramsci could be interpreted as a definition of transformative leadership. Management theories are just discovering what some intellectuals had understood from a popular mobilization imperative. This is particularly relevant when assessing the African liberation struggle. The most attuned to the need for interpretating the colonial phenomena, from a cultural perspective were probably Amilcar and Frantz Fanon. They end up using the elements of Gramsci’s organic intellectual approach: the need for an intellectual to act as a catalyst for societal mobilization, consciousness and struggle for rights. This is better illustrated through examples. I would like to dwell on two countries I know well – Guinea Bissau and Zimbabwe – to explain the main thrust of what our new book explores: the relationship between ownership and leadership as the key driver for capacity development.
The case of Guinea Bissau
The structural adjustment programme initiated in Guinea Bissau in the early eighties followed the usual recipe of economic liberalization and deregulation, privatization and fiscal balance. This was done under the assumption that a more stable macro-economic environment would entice foreign direct investment as well as create domestic incentives for growth. These intentions were well received then. There was a genuine, albeit naïve, belief that the newly independent country would be a very attractive destination for investments. This belief was reinforced by the generous development aid received, which could easily be misinterpreted has having strategic intentions. The climate provoked by the Cold War rivalry reinforced this impression. The limited experience of the professional cadre made them vulnerable to what looked like well crafted external advice, coming from influential institutions such as the World Bank.
It has become obvious that countries such as Guinea Bissau had little to offer to foreign direct investors, unless such investors wanted to make a quick buck and get out. Likewise privatizing State assets in a country without an entrepreneurial class and savings capacity was tantamount to perverting the system and expanding corruption. The alienation of State assets did not increase the role of a productive private sector but rather facilitated a quick change in attitudes, including profiteering and patrimonial use of public goods.
The structural adjustment programme’s failure to produce results, combined with increased external debt created the conditions for a very fragile socio-economic situation. A country with the characteristics of Guinea Bissau had not yet consolidated its nationhood when it was already facing centrifugal pressure to change the composition of its class structure and economic reproduction. None of these shifts was subject to proper internal debate and certainly none was owned by the majority of the population. By introducing a new development model without ownership the entire leadership of the country started losing its grip on society and the fragility of the national consensus was broken.
The imperatives of a quick institutional move towards superficial democracy (reduced to more or less organizing supervised elections and not much else), generated a further destabilizing element. It is not difficult to imagine the confusing political developments in the later part of the eighties. Instead of a natural evolution of the liberation movement towards advanced forms of participatory democracy, transparent practices and human rights expansion, preference was given to representative democracy, without the safeguards that would increase real democratic practice. The end result has been a succession of military coups and political crises that instead of being eliminated by the new ‘democratic order’ following the first UN supervised elections in 1988, have since – in fact – experienced a boost.
Under the circumstances the little institutional capacity created in the country after independence became quite vulnerable to human security concerns. Each conflict could provoke a migration of a few hundred highly educated families. After three major coups and a civil war the equivalent of a middle class has just disappeared. It is plausible to accept that the evaporation of the country’s management capacity was to a large extent influenced by externally-induced policies that did not take into account the imperatives of leadership.
The example of Guinea Bissau demonstrates that a country with only 14 university graduates at the time of independence in 1973 could climb the ladder and establish a minimum managerial capacity. It was centred on State functions; it was fragile and dependant on a particular political order. The way Guinea Bissau was managed in the first decade after independence was not corrupt and leadership had the vision to invest in capacity development. This situation started to change with the imperatives of structural adjustment which created illusive prospects of economic progress that did not materialize.
The case of Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe was for at least the first 15 years of independence a beacon of pragmatism, reconciliation and aggressive social policies. The results of these conciliatory policies surprised the world. The country was then considered an example of responsible leadership. However the social indicators performance, particularly health and education, was not matched with political liberalization. The country had unresolved issues that made it vulnerable to tensions. Land access pressures, the unresolved dilemma of Zimbabwean history remained present in the national debate but very little progress was actually made towards implementing a land reform.
Economic performance and strong social policies protected the government from open criticism and challenge, both internally and externally. This situation changed when Zimbabwe started to face pressures for the implementation of a structural adjustment programme. A home grown reform initiative, promoted by government in 1992, tried to create enough space for Zimbabwe not to have a course of action dictated to it. This proud country was very sensitive to ownership dimensions. Leadership was exercised at its best. But the unique situation that transformed Zimbabwe into a success story was about to change dramatically.
After a devastating historical drought in the same year the new economic reform plan was supposed to be implemented Zimbabwe was battered and had little to show. The external pressures for reform increased further and the government stepped up efforts for the implementation of sweeping changes in the financial and industrial sector as well as privatization of public assets, through a deliberate policy of indigeniza-tion. As tempting as the comparisons with Guinea Bissau might be at this point, the two countries are very different. Zimbabwe has (still) the best education record in the continent, was then the second most industrialized economy, and had a large entrepreneurial cadre and a sizeable middle class.
These factors reinforced the challenge to leadership under the stressful conditions provoked by two droughts (1992 and 1995) and declining macro-economic stability. External pressures for political reform started in fact in 1996 after a series of public service strikes demonstrated the fragility of an apparent national consensus. Zimbabweans started to ask for more participation, more democracy. It was therefore not surprising that as soon as civil society organizations and social movements increased their space government structures reacted defensively. Zimbabwe’s quasi one party system became hostage to a conflicting and polarized society. Even though Zimbabwe could count on a large middle class and well educated population, these factors could not impede a slide in the economic and social situation provoked by poor leadership in managing a fast changing environment.
Since 1998 Zimbabwe has entered into a sliding crisis which has transformed the country into an international pariah, showing the worst economic results for any country not directly engaged in a civil war. Again the role leadership plays in capacity development is clearly demonstrated. Educated Zimbabweans, from highly skilled doctors to industrial workers, are fleeing the country in large numbers, quickly eroding the continental record the country had for educational and capacity attainment.
Important elements to take into account
Capacity development is about creating conditions that allow and support the right people to take up the right roles in effective decision-action processes. It is both a means of goal realization and an end in itself. It is an umbrella concept that has evolved to encompass – institution building, institutional/organizational development, human resource development, and more recently, policy formulation. This umbrella provides a framework that links previous approaches to a coherent strategy with a long-term perspective and harnesses it to the goal of sustainable development. Since it is not a static concept it encompasses building, effective utilization, updating/upgrading and retention of capacity, thus going beyond the first step of building or creating capacity.
The debate about rethinking technical cooperation to centre it on capacity development, highlights fundamental elements that must be taken into account. First, human skills enhancement is always good. Second, there is a need to balance external input and ownership. Third, capacity development, like development itself, requires a long-term frame. Fourth, ownership is premised in self-confidence. Fifth, ownership is better exercised within a clear accountability system. Sixth, the development industry is undermining harmonization. Seventh, technical cooperation costs introduce wrong incentives. And, eighth, the political dimension of development has to take central stage.
These elements were either not respected by leaders or ignored by partners in the two examples briefly presented above.These are just examples of the need for a further debate on these issues. Understanding leadership is essential for that purpose .
Suggested reading on leadership and capacity
Berg, Elliot (ed.), Rethinking Technical Cooperation. Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa. New York: UNDP-DAI, 1993.
Forrest, Joshua, Lineages of State Fragility: Rural civil society in Guinea Bissau. Ohio University Press, 2003.
Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, C. Lopes, and K. Malik, Capacity for Development: New Solutions to Old Problems. New York/London: UNDP-Earthscan, 2002.
Hauck, Volker, Resilience and high performance amidst conflict, epidemics and extreme poverty: The case of Lacor Hospital, Northern Uganda. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2004 (still in draft).
Meredith, Martin, Mugabe: Power and plunder in Zimbabwe. Perseus Press, 2002.
Morgan, Peter, Building Capabilities for Performance: The OECS/ESDU Case. Maastricht: ECDPM, 2003.
Morgan, Peter, Organising for Large-Scale System Change: The ENACT Case in Jamaica. Maastricht: ECDPM. 2003.
Moyo, Sam, J. Makumbe, and E. Mudenda, NGOs, the State and Politics in Zimbabwe. Harare: SAPES Books, 2000.
