Urban youth and livelihoods in Zimbabwe

By: Penny Hlupo, Youth worker and activist working in Harare, who for over a decade has worked with youth on the streets of urban areas with a focus on their economic and social rights.

Every Zimbabwean has been touched by the deteriorating economic and political situation in the country. Urban areas have been affected just as much as rural areas. But the former do not have the same cushioning social systems as the latter, which increases vulnerability for the urbanites. This article will try and look at the ways the urban youths have been affected and how they have responded to the multiple adversities facing them.

The problems
Beginning in 2000, Zimbabwe’s urban youths have been victims of a devastating cocktail of social, economic and political adversities. With the shrinking of industry in the thick of a declining economy, there are no jobs to talk about, which means that those dropping out of the school system, have very slim prospects of ever earning a salary in the formal sector, which is itself in the throes of survival struggles that are proving worse as each day passes.

Looking at the available alternatives left for the youths, one finds that the atmosphere is pretty unfriendly. Zimbabwe adheres to very strict urban planning standards that strongly focus on the physical aspects of cities. Because the formalised system needs official approval for most, if not all, economic ventures available to the youth, the youth, who as mentioned above fail to make it into the ever-dwindling job markets, are left with no option but to break the law or violate some standing regulation put in place by central government or local municipalities. A quarter of a century after independence, it appears there is no independence in carrying out activities that are designed to secure a livelihood for the practitioners.

Despite the fact that the problems facing the country, including the cities, are common knowledge there has not been a conscious effort to liberate the planning of activities in the cities. And there has been no decrease in the intolerance from both central and local government. Where the law is not observed, the authorities are sure to descend heavily on the so-called perpetrators. This comes in the form of so-called ‘clean-up campaigns’, which are designed to return the cities to their purported colonial grandeur. The ultimate phase of the clean-up campaign came in the form of Operation Murambatsvina (Drive out Filth), a massive city and town cleansing exercise resulting in poor people losing their homes and livelihoods.

Even before the operation, talking to the troubled youths one got the feeling that they knew that their livelihood practices were clearly doomed right from the start. But deprived of any viable alternatives the urban youths have no option but to take the chance and face the consequences. Even after the notorious operation, one still gets the feeling that the youths are fully prepared to face the music again and again because there is simply no survival option. As they say in the vernacular Shona: “Kusiri kufa ndekupi?”(literally, “Which way is not death?”) meaning whatever alternative they take, they will always come out the eventual big losers. In other words, if they do not carry out the forbidden practices they starve to death; if they practise them, the law deals with them ruthlessly.

Negotiating the adversity
But the youth are not as hopeless as it may seem. Over the years (before the notorious Operation Murambatsvina), they have come up with skills and strategies that have made sure that they get their way in the cities and towns. In the last six years they have perfected these skills and strategies to a level where survival is now guaranteed in a hostile environment.

The first strategy is clientelism. The practice is characterized by “patron-client” relationships. In such places, politically powerful and rich “patrons” are approached to provide the powerless and poor youths (their ‘clients’) protection and other benefits in exchange for other forms of loyalty, including votes and some forms of political support, including thuggery. The patrons are mainly politically and economically well-connected individuals in the ruling party or local authorities who calculate that one day they will have to call on the services of the youth, who will then have the opportunity to repay the debts. In this way, the youth are promised that the authorities will not disrupt their businesses as long as they meet their part of the bargain in delivering votes, voices and muscle when the patrons decide it is time for payback.

The second strategy is bribery. In the notoriously corrupt society that Zimbabwe is increasingly turning into, youth find it easy to pay some officials to look the other way as the youth continue to break the law and ignore some regulations. This is very easy for the youth as some of them actually make more money from their ventures than a lot of the council and government officials, especially the police, earn. The fact that the low paid officials are the ones who are supposed to enforce the law on the ground makes the job of the youths easy.

The third strategy is blackmail. Once an official has been paid, that official is perpetually ‘in the pockets’ of the youths as they threaten to spill the beans if he or she does not deliver protection. Some youths are known to snoop into the lives of some officials and pick up some misdemeanours that they then use to force the officials to do as they (the youths) want. This writer is aware of at least four cases concerning adultery, theft, corruption and political affiliation that the youths have used to drive away and silence officials who have been harassing them. Because of the fear of exposure the officials try hard not to harass the youth. They also work hard to convince their colleagues not to make the lives of the youths harder.

The fourth strategy is violence, intimidation and vengeance. The ominous expression, “tichaonana” (“we will meet”), is indicative of what the youths are capable of doing. When they feel they have been unjustly treated, say by official raids, they single out some soft targets among council or government employees who confiscated their property or chased them away from their stands and plots. By the use of overt violence and acts of intimidation and vengeance, the youth promise to avenge their losses by inflicting harm on those responsible. And they get vengeance eventually. This makes some officials really careful when they are dealing with the youths, as the consequences can be dangerous.

Operation Murambatsvina and after
In May 2005, the government launched the controversial ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (“Drive out filth”) also known as ‘Operation Restore Order’. This was reportedly intended to restore order and sanity to the cities and towns of Zimbabwe. This in itself stands as testimony to how far the youth had entrenched themselves in the extra-legal and illegal operations in the urban areas. Most of the illegal uses of land, among which were vending, black market trading, selling of curios and some repairs of vehicles and appliances, were the preserve of youths.

When the operation came, there was no way of stopping it or avoiding it. This is so, because rather than dealing with individuals within the system, the youth found themselves as victims of the entire system, that is, central government with the full blessing of the ruling party’s supreme decision-making body. The youths’ crude tactics could not work this time round. The operation was faceless and impersonal and there was no way of negotiating with and around it. The operation could not be threatened, bribed, or petitioned.

By the beginning of July, the youth were no longer the kings and queens of places they did not own and which they did not use legally. They were no longer making a living by flouting the law and silencing individuals. They were simply swept away. To be sure, they do come out occasionally to try to make a living, but the ruthless hand of the operation, urged on by the official media, always catches up with them and sweeps them away again and again.

Conclusion
The youth in urban Zimbabwe have long been victims of a declining economy, ineffective systems of governance, as well as local and central government institutions and legal and regulatory instruments that are anything but friendly to alternative ways of making a living. For some time the youths did manage to live a life outside the formal systems. This is a precarious life that was prolonged by crude tactics and methods that relied on softening up individuals within the system. But then Operation Restore Order came suddenly. It was a strange challenge that the youths could not handle because, instead of breaching weak links in the system, the youth were now faced with the whole determined system. The youths have yet to come up with strategies that tackle the new challenge. Judging from history, it is only a matter of time before they discover that working formula .

Selected reading
Government of Zimbabwe, Response by Government of Zimbabwe to the Report by the UN Special Envoy on Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order. Harare: Government of Zimbabwe, 2005.

Kamete, A.Y., Shifting Perceptions and Changing Responses: Governing the Poor in Harare, Zimbabwe. NAI Research Report no. 122. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2002.

Solidarity Peace Trust, Discarding the Filth: Operation Murambatsvina. Interim Report on the Zimbabwean Government’s “Urban Cleansing” and Forced Eviction Campaign May/June 2005. Harare: Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005.

Tibaijuka, A.K., Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe. New York, NY: United Nations, 2005.

Wekwete, K.H. and C.O. Rambanapasi (eds), Planning Urban Economies in Southern and Eastern Africa. Aldershot: Avebury, 1994.