Congo-Brazzaville: Multipartyism or illiberal democracy?

By: Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, Professor of political science, Wells College; visiting scholar at Cornell University; and director of Panafrican Studies and Research Center in International Relations and Education for Development (CEPARRED).

In recent times media reports and scholarly articles have tended to focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where violent conflict has raged since 1998 in what has been described as Africa’s World War. This pre-occupation with the DRC has tended to eclipse the developments in its neighbouring state, the Republic of Congo or Congo-Brazzaville, where violent conflict – though formally ended by a peace agreement between the government and rebels in 2001 – has given way to an uneasy peace and a lingering humanitarian crisis in parts of the country. The victory of Denis Sassou-Nguesso – who seized power in 1992 and 1997 – in the 2002 elections has been violently contested by rebel groups allegedly loyal to former President Pascal Lissouba, who won the 1992 elections, and the Ninja militia active in the Pool region of the country. This occurs in spite of the March 2003 Peace Agreement, and other initiatives to achieve post-conflict democratization and reconstruction. Although an elected government and parliament are in place, the country is still being buffeted by sporadic violent conflict, poverty and a humanitarian crisis. At the heart of the current impasse is the challenge of transforming the situation in Congo from war to peace. The outcome will depend on the democratization of Congolese society.

The relevant question remains if Congo-Brazzaville since 2002 has been en route to multiparty democracy or de facto regressing to authoritarianism? Recently, the evidence suggests that there have been signals of activism within civil society and a demonstrated willingness by the Congolese government to respond to the demands for multiparty democracy.

Congo-Brazzaville, like many other countries in Africa, bowed to the waves of multiparty democracy that engulfed the continent in the 1990s. However, not too long after the return to multipartyism in 1992, it was overturned by violent means by a former military ruler, Sassou-Nguesso, who has since tried to legitimize his rule, by organizing subsequent multiparty elections (that he has won), and by seeking the inclusion of some of his erstwhile political opponents in his government. This effort has been complicated by the resistance of private militia groups and politicians fighting against Sassou-Nguesso’s government, which they insist seized power illegitimately. Thus, parts of southern Congo have witnessed continued militia activity, in spite of several peace agreements between the government and rebel groups. The result has been the widespread destruction of property and lives, and the displacement of close to a hundred thousand Congolese, thus further complicating a situation in which Congo itself hosts almost a hundred thousand refugees who fled the horrors of war in neighbouring states such as the DRC and Rwanda. Some Congolese are also refugees in neighbouring states. The reality that some of the militia groups reflect regional and ethnic identities and interests has also undermined national stability and cohesion and worsened the humanitarian crisis in the country.

Background to the crisis
It is important to sketch the background to the present crisis in the Congo. Congo gained its independence on August 15, 1960, after a period of nationalist struggle led by its elite. Independence was achieved through negotiation within the French African Federation and Charles de Gaulle’s approach of gradualism and integration into the broader French community. Prior to independence, in 1959, ethnic politics also exploded after the 1958 referendum in which the Congolese voted yes to the new French Constitution.

However, despite some ideological efforts to challenge the domination of France, including at some point the adoption of socialism, the Congolese state has gravitated within the French orbit of power. The nature of Congo-France relations has mainly been determined by the discovery of petroleum off the Congolese coast. The French petroleum parastatal TotalFinaElf has managed the production of oil on the basis of an unequal partnership investment with the Congolese state and power elite. Congo is therefore a rentier mono-cultural economy, in which oil accounts for 95 percent of export earnings, 60 percent of GDP, and approximately 75 percent of tax revenue. The exploitation and control of Congolese oil by French interests, has had direct implications for violent politics in the country, as these external interests provide resources with which the Congolese state wages war against its opponents.

At the end of the Cold War, Congo was under pressure from internal demands for democracy, and an external environment in support of multipartyism. The process of re-defining Congolese state power after the National Conference, which took place in 1991, reflected a slow phasing out or decay of institutions, and a growing privatization of violence. This contributed to the transformation of the party in power, and some opposition parties into militias, and the de facto partitioning of the country by the various armed factions. Furthermore, access to the remnants of state power was largely dependent on the Machiavellian behaviour of the political leadership, and complex alliances and conflicts that reflected strong ethnic and regional solidarities or cleavages. Under these conditions, the state in Congo was confronted by a crisis of legitimacy, which led to violent factional struggles for power and further challenges to the state’s claim to authority, undermining any real social stability and blocking the prospects for sustainable peace and development.

The manipulation of ethnic identities and regional differences by major political figures, coupled with the interventionist role of external oil interests contributed to the outbreak of a bloody civil war in the 1990s.

Ideological trends in Congolese politics
Congolese politics since the country’s independence has been dominated by various state ideologies. For instance, Fulbert Youlou, the first president of Congo-Brazzaville, was pro-French and pro-West; while Alphonse Massamba-Débat in 1964 declared the first Marxist-Leninist political party and Marxist regime in Africa. Marien Ngouabi in 1968 created his own Marxist-Leninist party, the Congolese Workers’ Party, and declared the Congo a People’s Republic. Despite the totalitarian tendencies of the past regimes, Congo has never produced political absolutism similar to that of Mobutu in Zaire/DRC, of Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, or that of Bokassa in the Central African Republic.

On February 5, 1979, General Sassou-Nguesso seized power and maintained the inherited one-party rule as the head of the Congolese Labour Party until the Sovereign National Conference of 1991. After he was stripped of all powers by the resolutions of the National Conference, like Yhomby-Opango in different circumstances in 1979, he was reduced to only being a symbol of the state. However, with military support from Angola and backing from France, which had strategic and economic (oil) interests to protect, he built a private army in his native northern Congo and forcibly re-took power and declared himself the president in October 1997 after four months of war against the duly elected President, the socialist and pan-Africanist Pascal Lissouba. After seizing power, Sassou-Nguesso turned round and called for “peace agreements” and created the forum for reconciliation in 1999. His opponent – the overthrown President-elect Lissouba, has in turn sought to return to power, this time by violent means. In seeking to reinforce his legitimacy, Sassou-Nguesso has organized a transition process resulting in peace agreements, elections and a process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration for the various Congolese militias and their combatants. But the post-war transitions initiated by the Congolese government have not been accepted by all the armed militias and political groups, nor have they led to any meaningful sharing of power.

The reasons for the problems besetting the Congolese transition lie partly in the fact that the regime in power embodies elements both of multipartyism and an illiberal democracy. With the new constitution adopted by referendum in January 2002, a multiparty democracy with wide-ranging powers was established, at least on paper. Sassou-Nguesso perceives himself as a “prophet of peace” in accepting constitutionalism despite the extreme violence he used to re-capture power in Congo and maintain himself in state power. Despite the allegations of electoral irregularities, he was declared the winner of the March 2002 presidential elections gaining 89 percent of the votes cast, and returned for a seven-year term in office. After this contested victory, he embarked on another peace process leading up to the 2003 peace agreement with the Ninja militia, which appears to be only partly effective. Thus, the current regime’s claim to multiparty democracy is limited by it only being tolerated to the extent that it does not challenge Sassou-Nguesso’s grip on power over Congo. This political construct could be described as “a kind of illiberal democracy where formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal authority, but rulers violate the rules so strikingly that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards of democracy” (S. Levitsky and L.A. Way: ‘The Rise of Competitive Authoritarism’ in Journal of Democracy, 13.2 [2002]). In this connection, the brand of democracy practised by the President has not led to any real reconciliation with the major opposition groups represented by Pascal Lissouba, Bernard Kolelas, and Joachim Yhomby-Opango and their supporters. More importantly, it has not led to the transfer of power to the people nor led to peace and stability in the troubled republic.

Since the outbreak of civil war between the government forces and militia groups in the 1990s, there have been gross violations of human rights. More recently, human rights groups have charged that some 353 people, who disappeared in the Beach border area between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Congo-Brazzaville, were killed with the alleged direct complicity of the Congolese government. In July 2005, the trial of the 16 highest-ranking government security officials, accused of murdering Congolese returnees suspected of being opposed to President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, opened in Brazzaville with a fanfare. However, the subsequent acquittal of the accused, on August 18, 2005, has further angered the victims’ families despite the courts ruling that the sum of 10 million CFA be awarded to around 100 victims’ families. It would appear that the ruling was largely “political”, and directed at providing the government with some legitimacy, without providing justice for the victims of the excesses of the state’s security force. While Sassou-Nguesso has been hard-pressed to project himself as a “new democrat” who respects the rule of law and constitutional rights of the citizens, some of the government’s policies have continued to contradict the processes of post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration that are so important to peace and development in the Congo. It would appear that the legacy of long years of military and one party rule has continued to suffocate and subvert the march of the Congo to full-fledged multiparty democratic rule.

Concluding remarks
In spite of the broad picture of an “illiberal democracy” in Congo-Brazzaville, there have been some modest improvements under multipartyism. These can be found in some sections of civil society that, however, remains weak and lacks real autonomy from the state. Such developments include the rise of independent media, the diversity of political parties, and some respect for basic human rights and freedoms. The government’s direct censorship has been relatively limited in the media and professional associations. Academic freedom is also tolerated in research-oriented activities. The separation of powers between the various arms of government has also been partially respected. However, the centralization of power and excessive control of the national oil resources by executive power, and the fact that the mechanisms for sharing these resources are used on the basis of personal loyalty, have slowed down any efforts at democratization. The resistance to an equitable power-sharing arrangement and lack of transparency in public policies remain important elements of Congolese politics that reinforce illiberal democracy. Thus the dominant tendency has been towards (multiparty) autocratic and patrimonial tendencies centred on personification of power.

In its relations with France, Congo has remained a prisoner of its history. A more decisive advancement of its democracy will require diversifying its foreign investment base and trade relations, reviving its leftist/progressive legacies, and adapting them into the new global imperatives.

Inter-ethnic conflicts should be dealt with, not through the lenses of the forum of “psycho-moral” reconciliation – like in South Africa, where economic power is still in the hands of the minority – but through the setting up of a new policy of equitable re-distribution of resources on the basis of decentralized and democratic political arrangements. Since the Congolese political elite has had some exposure to progressive and trade unionist traditions, the premise of “each person according to her/his need” can better guide its policy with respect to social justice, democratization, reconciliation and post-war reconstruction in Congo. The establishment of post-war democracy in the republic of Congo requires a return to the popular constitution that emerged out of the discourse of the Sovereign National Conference, and a commitment by all national actors, regional players and the international community, including France, to respect the wishes and collective interests of the Congolese people.

The Republic of Congo in brief

Area: 342,000 sq. km

Population (2004): 3.0 million

Capital: Brazzaville

Urbanisation: 70% of the population lives in Brazzaville

Ethnic groups: 15 major ethnic groups, which are sub-divided into 75 smaller sub-ethnic groups. The Bakongo is the largest group (48% of the total population). Other major groups are Sangha, Teke and M’Bochi.

Gross Domestic Product (2003): USD 2.186 billion

Per capita income (2003): USD 700 per year

Life expectancy (2004): 49.51 years

Selected reading
Bernault, F., Démocraties ambiguës en Afrique centrale. Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon: 1940–1965, Paris, Karthala, 1996.

Bowao, Ch., Congo. Conférence Nationale Souveraine–Ethnopartisme et démocratie: le ruse historique? In Démocratie Africaines no. 4, octobre-novembre-décembre, 1995.

Kissita (Achille), Congo: Trois décennies d’une démocratie introuvable. Tome 1. Les éditions S.E.D., Brazzaville, 1993.

Koula, Y., La démocratie congolaise “brûlée” au pétrole, Paris, l’Harmattan, 1999.

Missié Jean-Pierre, “Conflits et Résolutions des Conflits au Congo-Brazzaville – 1992-2002”. 2004.

JEDIRAF, Vol. 6, Nos 1 and 2, June/December, 2004.

Missié Jean-Pierre, “Construction identitaire et violence politique au Congo-Brazzaville: Le rôle des leaders,” Annales de l’Université de Lomé. Tome XXIII, 2003.

Moukouéké, C., Congo-Brazzaville, 30 ans de révolution pour rien: la fin d’une illusion, Abidjan, Editions Condor, 2000.

Steven, Evitsky, and Way, Lucan A., “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy (11:2), 2002.