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Nigeria has had a chequered electoral history with successive elections being marred by serious irregularities and controversy. This has led in most cases to the collapse of democratic experiments as occurred in 1966 and 1983. The 2007 general elections provided a good opportunity to occasion a break with the past, and rekindle public confidence in the electoral and democratic process of the country. Unfortunately, this was not to be. The elections were regarded as the worst ever in Nigeria’s political history. The elections were severely condemned by virtually all Election Observer groups – local and international – who monitored them. They were considered to be extremely fraudulent, not credible, or free, fair and transparent. In one word, the elections were a sham. The preliminary statement of the European Union Election Observer Mission of 23 April 2007, issued shortly after the presidential elections, aptly captures the general perception and conclusion on the elections. According to the statement, “the 2007 state and federal elections have fallen far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the elections have not lived to up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible”.
Put differently, the elections were a betrayal of the Nigerian people as the results did not largely reflect the wishes and aspirations of the people. But how did Nigeria steep off the learning curve in electoral administration and management? What went wrong with the conduct of the 2007 elections, to have produced such a controversial and illegitimate outcome? Is Nigeria jinxed with regard to the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections?
Contrived political tension and confusion
The prevailing pre-election environment dating back to 2006 is quite important in understanding why the elections foundered. In 2006, when national attention and discourse should have been focused on how to conduct free and fair elections, the polity was unduly heated with several diversionary agendas and actions by the federal government. First was the issue of the third term agenda. The president wanted to manipulate the constitution to afford him a chance to run for another four years in office against the provisions of the constitution. The constitution only allows a maximum of two terms of four years each for both the president and the state governors. The third term agenda was extremely unpopular in Nigeria and therefore had a coalition of major stakeholders including some members of the political class, civil society and the media effectively mobilizing against it. The Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, was the spear-head of the resistance by the political class against the third term agenda. The third term agenda was to be a substitute for the general elections; hence its discussion precluded any meaningful planning towards the elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In other words, had the third term agenda succeeded, there could possibly have been no competitive elections in Nigeria in 2007. Inevitably, the third term agenda was defeated by the Nigerian people as the National Assembly refused to endorse it and voted it out.
The second issue that provoked political tension and confusion was the gale of impeachments of elected state governors across the country through the mechanics of the state anti-graft agency – the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The issue was not whether corrupt elected public officials should be tried and removed from office or not, apparently, Nigerians believe they should be. However, the issue was the unprocedural and Gestapo way in which it was conducted. Some allegedly corrupt state governors were abducted, and members of the State Houses of Assembly were harassed, intimidated and threatened, forcing them to initiate impeachment proceedings against their state governors. In Balyesa, Plateau, Oyo and Anambra states, the governors were removed from office. The timing, procedure, and selective nature of the exercise compromised this. The Supreme Court has since reversed three of the four cases and reinstated the governors of Oyo, Anambra and Plateau states.
It was not only the governors that were affected; President Obasanjo unilaterally declared the office of the Vice President vacant, after the latter defected to a new political party, the Action Congress (AC) in order to actualize his presidential ambition. It took a Supreme Court decision for the Vice President to retain his position.
The threat of impeachment virtually froze the political space, as political activities were almost suspended for fear of political prosecution on allegations of corruption.
The party primaries further heightened political tension. Internal democracy was the exception rather than the rule in virtually all the political parties. The party leadership constituted themselves into a cabal of political barons, who disregarded the result of party primaries and unilaterally anointed the party candidates for the general elections. This constitutes the first phase in the subversion of the people’s will.
Weak electoral institution, false start
There are structural and institutional dimensions to the problem of electoral management in Nigeria. Nigeria’s electoral commission is not an independent one. In spite of the reform of the electoral law in 2006, the electoral commissioners are appointed by the president, and they report to him. The commission also does not enjoy financial autonomy as the executive determines its level of funding and disbursement. Indeed, a curious part of the electoral law is that those to be appointed as electoral commissioners must be qualified to be members of the House of Representatives. The interpretation of this, which may not necessarily be in the spirit of the law, is that those appointed as members of the electoral commission should be party members, as party membership is a major criterion to be elected into the House of Representatives. Nigeria does not allow independent candidacy in elections.
With this structural problem, the electoral commission has always been prone to manipulations and control from the federal authorities.
The preparations of INEC for the elections were very shoddy and non-transparent. The voter registration exercise, which took off on 7 October 2006 was marred by complaints from the electorate. INEC had introduced a computerized direct data capturing process to modernize the voter registration exercise and prevent the abuse of the process through multiple registration. However, the whole exercise was poorly executed with inadequate provision of the necessary equipment and materials to facilitate it. As a result, INEC had to extend the period of the registration, which ought to have ended in December 2006, to 2 February 2007. At the end of the exercise INEC claimed to have registered about 61 million voters declaring the exercise a ‘huge success’ despite criticisms from the civil society and National Assembly. INEC did not display the voters’ registrar as provided for in the electoral law, but only did so a few days prior to the elections.
The most disturbing of INEC’s actions was its insistence on disqualifying some party candidates from contesting the elections; powers not conferred on it by the electoral law. The power to disqualify candidates is reserved for the courts. In a suspect move, the EFCC suddenly generated what it called an ‘advisory list’ of ‘corrupt’ politicians who should not be allowed to contest for public office. The federal government quickly responded to this, by setting up an ad hoc administrative panel to consider the list. Within a few days, the panel completed its work with a recommendation that those indicted should have their names gazetted, and disqualified from contesting the 2007 elections. Their names were swiftly gazzetted by the federal government, and INEC subsequently disqualified them. Major opposition leaders including the Vice President became casualties of this policy.
On 16 April 2007, the Supreme Court in a landmark but unanimous judgement nullified the action of INEC with the ruling that INEC did not have the powers to disqualify candidates for elections. Before the judgement, INEC had already shortchanged some candidates at the state and House of Assembly elections held on 14 April 2007, who were illegally disqualified and their names not included on the ballot paper.
As the preparations for the elections preceded, rather than form a partnership with credible civil society organizations with vast experience on electoral matters like the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), the INEC Chairman, Maurice Iwu waged a ceaseless war against those groups and the media. Some of the groups were denied accreditation to monitor the elections and were also harassed by the state security agents.
Flawed elections, manufactured results
Elections were conducted on two dates: 14 and 21 April 2007. The first was at the state level for the governorship and House of Assembly and the latter at the federal level for the presidency and National Assembly. Apart from a slight adjustment in voting time, which for the first election was 9.00 am – 3.00 pm and for the second, 10.00 am – 5.00 pm, and also the level of voter turnout which was more for the first election, the two elections had basically the same features. Some of the features as documented by virtually all the election observer groups include:
There are tortuous and challenging days ahead for Nigeria’s fragile democratic experiment. The reform of the country’s electoral institution will constitute a major step in rebuilding public confidence in the nation’s faltering democracy.
Research and analysis on Africa
When votes do not count:
The 2007 general elections in Nigeria
The author of this article was part of the Coordinating Team of the ECOWAS Observer Mission to the Nigerian elections and shares his analysis of why the elections were such a failure as regards developing democracy in Nigeria. The views expressed herein are personal and in no way reflect the official position of ECOWAS.
By: Said Adejumobi
With fifty political parties competing for power, Nigerians went to the polls on 14 and 21 April 2007 to elect new political leaders at the state and federal levels including a new president for the country. The elections were a historic attempt at the transfer of political power from an elected civilian administration to another. Although, civil rule was reinstalled in Nigeria in May 1999 after 15 years of military interregnum, it was yet to conduct a civilian to civilian transfer of power at the federal level, as the mandate of the out-going president, Olusegun Obasanjo was renewed in 2003, for a second term of four years in office.Nigeria has had a chequered electoral history with successive elections being marred by serious irregularities and controversy. This has led in most cases to the collapse of democratic experiments as occurred in 1966 and 1983. The 2007 general elections provided a good opportunity to occasion a break with the past, and rekindle public confidence in the electoral and democratic process of the country. Unfortunately, this was not to be. The elections were regarded as the worst ever in Nigeria’s political history. The elections were severely condemned by virtually all Election Observer groups – local and international – who monitored them. They were considered to be extremely fraudulent, not credible, or free, fair and transparent. In one word, the elections were a sham. The preliminary statement of the European Union Election Observer Mission of 23 April 2007, issued shortly after the presidential elections, aptly captures the general perception and conclusion on the elections. According to the statement, “the 2007 state and federal elections have fallen far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections. They were marred by poor organization, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during result collation process, voter disenfranchisement at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence. As a result, the elections have not lived to up to the hopes and expectations of the Nigerian people and the process cannot be considered to have been credible”.
Put differently, the elections were a betrayal of the Nigerian people as the results did not largely reflect the wishes and aspirations of the people. But how did Nigeria steep off the learning curve in electoral administration and management? What went wrong with the conduct of the 2007 elections, to have produced such a controversial and illegitimate outcome? Is Nigeria jinxed with regard to the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections?
Contrived political tension and confusion
The prevailing pre-election environment dating back to 2006 is quite important in understanding why the elections foundered. In 2006, when national attention and discourse should have been focused on how to conduct free and fair elections, the polity was unduly heated with several diversionary agendas and actions by the federal government. First was the issue of the third term agenda. The president wanted to manipulate the constitution to afford him a chance to run for another four years in office against the provisions of the constitution. The constitution only allows a maximum of two terms of four years each for both the president and the state governors. The third term agenda was extremely unpopular in Nigeria and therefore had a coalition of major stakeholders including some members of the political class, civil society and the media effectively mobilizing against it. The Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, was the spear-head of the resistance by the political class against the third term agenda. The third term agenda was to be a substitute for the general elections; hence its discussion precluded any meaningful planning towards the elections by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In other words, had the third term agenda succeeded, there could possibly have been no competitive elections in Nigeria in 2007. Inevitably, the third term agenda was defeated by the Nigerian people as the National Assembly refused to endorse it and voted it out.
The second issue that provoked political tension and confusion was the gale of impeachments of elected state governors across the country through the mechanics of the state anti-graft agency – the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The issue was not whether corrupt elected public officials should be tried and removed from office or not, apparently, Nigerians believe they should be. However, the issue was the unprocedural and Gestapo way in which it was conducted. Some allegedly corrupt state governors were abducted, and members of the State Houses of Assembly were harassed, intimidated and threatened, forcing them to initiate impeachment proceedings against their state governors. In Balyesa, Plateau, Oyo and Anambra states, the governors were removed from office. The timing, procedure, and selective nature of the exercise compromised this. The Supreme Court has since reversed three of the four cases and reinstated the governors of Oyo, Anambra and Plateau states.
It was not only the governors that were affected; President Obasanjo unilaterally declared the office of the Vice President vacant, after the latter defected to a new political party, the Action Congress (AC) in order to actualize his presidential ambition. It took a Supreme Court decision for the Vice President to retain his position.
The threat of impeachment virtually froze the political space, as political activities were almost suspended for fear of political prosecution on allegations of corruption.
The party primaries further heightened political tension. Internal democracy was the exception rather than the rule in virtually all the political parties. The party leadership constituted themselves into a cabal of political barons, who disregarded the result of party primaries and unilaterally anointed the party candidates for the general elections. This constitutes the first phase in the subversion of the people’s will.
Weak electoral institution, false start
There are structural and institutional dimensions to the problem of electoral management in Nigeria. Nigeria’s electoral commission is not an independent one. In spite of the reform of the electoral law in 2006, the electoral commissioners are appointed by the president, and they report to him. The commission also does not enjoy financial autonomy as the executive determines its level of funding and disbursement. Indeed, a curious part of the electoral law is that those to be appointed as electoral commissioners must be qualified to be members of the House of Representatives. The interpretation of this, which may not necessarily be in the spirit of the law, is that those appointed as members of the electoral commission should be party members, as party membership is a major criterion to be elected into the House of Representatives. Nigeria does not allow independent candidacy in elections.
With this structural problem, the electoral commission has always been prone to manipulations and control from the federal authorities.
The preparations of INEC for the elections were very shoddy and non-transparent. The voter registration exercise, which took off on 7 October 2006 was marred by complaints from the electorate. INEC had introduced a computerized direct data capturing process to modernize the voter registration exercise and prevent the abuse of the process through multiple registration. However, the whole exercise was poorly executed with inadequate provision of the necessary equipment and materials to facilitate it. As a result, INEC had to extend the period of the registration, which ought to have ended in December 2006, to 2 February 2007. At the end of the exercise INEC claimed to have registered about 61 million voters declaring the exercise a ‘huge success’ despite criticisms from the civil society and National Assembly. INEC did not display the voters’ registrar as provided for in the electoral law, but only did so a few days prior to the elections.
The most disturbing of INEC’s actions was its insistence on disqualifying some party candidates from contesting the elections; powers not conferred on it by the electoral law. The power to disqualify candidates is reserved for the courts. In a suspect move, the EFCC suddenly generated what it called an ‘advisory list’ of ‘corrupt’ politicians who should not be allowed to contest for public office. The federal government quickly responded to this, by setting up an ad hoc administrative panel to consider the list. Within a few days, the panel completed its work with a recommendation that those indicted should have their names gazetted, and disqualified from contesting the 2007 elections. Their names were swiftly gazzetted by the federal government, and INEC subsequently disqualified them. Major opposition leaders including the Vice President became casualties of this policy.
On 16 April 2007, the Supreme Court in a landmark but unanimous judgement nullified the action of INEC with the ruling that INEC did not have the powers to disqualify candidates for elections. Before the judgement, INEC had already shortchanged some candidates at the state and House of Assembly elections held on 14 April 2007, who were illegally disqualified and their names not included on the ballot paper.
As the preparations for the elections preceded, rather than form a partnership with credible civil society organizations with vast experience on electoral matters like the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), the INEC Chairman, Maurice Iwu waged a ceaseless war against those groups and the media. Some of the groups were denied accreditation to monitor the elections and were also harassed by the state security agents.
Flawed elections, manufactured results
Elections were conducted on two dates: 14 and 21 April 2007. The first was at the state level for the governorship and House of Assembly and the latter at the federal level for the presidency and National Assembly. Apart from a slight adjustment in voting time, which for the first election was 9.00 am – 3.00 pm and for the second, 10.00 am – 5.00 pm, and also the level of voter turnout which was more for the first election, the two elections had basically the same features. Some of the features as documented by virtually all the election observer groups include:
- Late commencement of voting in many parts of the country
- Inadequate voting materials – ballot papers, result recording sheets, etc.
- Poor training and orientation of electoral officials
- Lack of secrecy in the voting process as there was no provision for polling booths
- Use of transparent ballot bags as opposed to ballot boxes, which compromised the security and safety of the ballot papers especially for the purpose of storage and recounting in case of dispute
- Omission of names or pictures of some candidates from the ballot papers
- Prevalence of under-age voters especially in the northern parts of the country
- Rampant cases of ballot bag snatching at gun point by party thugs and militias
- The stuffing of ballot bags with already thumb-printed ballot papers
- Reported cases of collaboration between security officials and party agents to rig elections
- Presence of heavily armed soldiers on the streets across the country which militarized the whole exercise
- Violence and intimidation of opposition political party members and agents
- Lack of transparency in the collation, counting and tabulation of votes
- Falsification of election results
There are tortuous and challenging days ahead for Nigeria’s fragile democratic experiment. The reform of the country’s electoral institution will constitute a major step in rebuilding public confidence in the nation’s faltering democracy.
Select reading
Adejumobi, S., ‘Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?’. In International Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 2000.
Agbaje A. and S. Adejumobi, ‘Do Votes Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria’. In Africa Development, vol. XXXI, no. 3, 2006.
ECOWAS Observer Mission, Preliminary Declaration on the Presidential and National Assembly Elections. Abuja, 23 April 2007.
European Union Election Observer Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions on the Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly Elections. 23 April, 2007.
Fawole, A., ‘Voting without Choosing: Interrogating the Crisis of Electoral Democracy in Nigeria’. In T. Lumumba-Kasongo (ed.), Liberal Democracy and Its Critics in Africa: Political Dysfunction and the Struggle for Social Progress. (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005).
Human Rights Watch, Election or ‘Selection’? Human Rights Abuse and Threats to Free and Fair Elections in Nigeria. Background Briefing, no. 1, April 2007.
Kurfi, A., Nigerian General Elections, 1951-2003: My Role and Reminiscences. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2005.
Lewis, P., ‘Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile State’. In Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 3, July, 2003.
National Democratic Institute, Statement on Nigeria’s April 21st Presidential and National Assembly Elections. Abuja, 23 April 2007.
the author
Said Adejumobi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lagos State University, and currently a Governance Adviser at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria.