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The existence of inequalities is not contested, but their size may be and they are of different types. One analysis by Davies et al (UNU-Wider, 2006) concludes that the Gini value for global wealth is 89 percent, which could be illustrated by one person in a group of ten taking 99 percent of a pie and the other nine sharing the remaining 1 percent. Another analysis by Milanovic (World Bank, 2006) shows that each of the richest five percent earns in 48 hours as much as each of the five percent poorest does in a year. North America, Europe and high income Asia-Pacific together account for almost 90 percent of global wealth.
Whether globalisation and economic liberalisation increase inequalities or not is subject to discussion. The effect will, according to some, depend on the position of the populous countries at a point in time. Others claim that liberalisation tends to be followed by increases in inequality, but that the causality is doubtful. A globalisation model described by Kremer and Maskin (Harvard, 2006) assuming one rich and one poor country and only one consumption item, shows efficiency gains through cross-border production and that inequality increases or remains the same in the poor country. Outcomes depend on the assumption made and how the globalisation model is specified.
Although the Millennium Development Goals relate to ideas about global justice and human rights, they do not address distribution or inequality directly. Poor people are being left behind in spite of acceptable national aggregates. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest share of poverty, nearly 50 percent, and it is not decreasing. Rural people struggle for survival through expanding agriculture and diversifying incomes. Deforestation takes place in developing countries, mainly in Africa and parts of Asia. Globally 13 million ha of tropical forest are degraded or disappear annually. Agriculture and deforestation account for between 25 and 45 percent of the total green-house gas emissions (GHG), according to Watson et al. (IPCC, 2000). The major part comes from developing countries. African rural poverty, in a context of subsistence and survival, thus contributes considerably to GHG emissions.
By far the largest GHG source globally is energy. It accounts for more than 60 percent of total GHG emissions, of which about 80 percent occur in rich countries. In these countries, tourism is estimated to double by 2020 implying a massive increase in air traffic and GHG emissions. Likewise the production and consumption patterns among the rich in the rich and poor countries show no trends towards reduction of GHG emissions. The notion of delinking consumption in the north from poverty in the south is also spreading (for example ‘product Red’ campaigned for by global celebrities). The ways poverty, consumption and climate change are addressed, tend to blur historical, structural and power features underlying global inequalities. This allows for a focus on market forces, e.g. carbon trading, to resolve the problems. This will not suffice and at best delay a real solution which subsequently will have to be developed in a situation of more acute global social injustice and possibly deeper conflicts.
Bio-fuel colonisation of rural African lands
Rather than reducing global inequalities and resolving the problem of GHG emissions and climate change through reduction in use of fossil fuels at the source, a grand design has emerged to develop liquid bio-fuels, in particular ethanol and bio-diesel. The objective is to reduce fossil fuel consumption, in particular in the transport sector. The most determining aspect in bio-fuel production is the feed-stock factor, e.g. sugar cane, maize and oil seeds, which account for more than half the production cost. The expansion of bio-fuel production has driven up food prices, e.g. that of maize by two-thirds over the last two years. The competition between energy and food already constitutes a real conflict. However, no developed country, except Brazil, can enhance energy security from domestic feedstock crops, since only a small portion of the demand for transport fuels can be met. For example, within the EU, conversion of about 70 percent of agricultural land would only raise the share of bio-fuels in the domestic consumption of transport fuels to ten percent. First generation technologies, and in particular manual harvesting, such as in Brazil, also have serious health and environmental impacts. Development of bio-fuel in Africa is currently based on the experiences from Brazil and large and well-watered areas, in particular in river valleys, are being taken into use or requested by investors. Considerable interest in African production of bio-fuels for export has been shown by European companies and donors.
However, the net ‘climate outcomes’ of e.g. ethanol for bio-fuel are questionable. Firstly it is being developed in large scale commercial farming that often pushes smallholders off their land. This trend is likely to continue in Africa where smallholder land rights are weak. Secondly, sugar cane production will compete with the most fertile food producing areas. Thirdly, as long as the production of feedstock crops leads to deforestation, the contribution of bio-fuels to the reduction of GHG emissions is questionable. Extremely good growth conditions in many African settings may generate large volumes of low cost bio-fuels and investors show keen interest as long as they do not need to ‘take care of’ the social, health and ecological problems associated with large scale production. This may emerge as a role for donors and the pressure on European aid agencies in this direction already exists. The speed of bio-fuel production in rural Africa is leading to contestation over scarce land and the marginalisation of smallholders and livestock people – a new form of colonisation is emerging.
The argument that significant efficiency gains could result from reallocation of global production to low-cost producers, such as in Africa, does not fully account for the GHG impacts from long haul transports. High petroleum costs may, however, make bio-fuel production economically viable in some oil-importing countries, in particular land-locked, oil importing countries.
The role of donors and global governance
Issues related to inequality, energy and climate are of a global character – there is no longer one solution for the south and one for the north. Donor agencies have a particular south focus which does not allow for an understanding of the complexity of global issues. At the national level new institutions have to be formed for this purpose. Likewise institutions of learning and research have to be reorganised to address real and complex problems and issues. In addition global governance and agreements need to expand and become strengthened and include effective sanctions. Global taxation of the very rich in favour of the many very poor also has to be developed so that global inequality and injustice can be further addressed. Land rights of smallholders in rural Africa have to be strengthened in order to avoid bio-fuel colonisation leading to increased poverty and inequality with negative impacts on the climate.
Research and analysis on Africa
The relationship between inequality and climate change
Inequalities of wealth, region, gender and ethnicity are bad not only for growth, democracy and social cohesion. Kjell Havnevik argues that they also have a negative impact on climate change.
The article is a summary of a presentation given at an EU conference on Sustainable Development in Africa which took place in Berlin in June 2007.
The article is a summary of a presentation given at an EU conference on Sustainable Development in Africa which took place in Berlin in June 2007.
By Kjell Havnevik
Deep inequalities of wealth, region, gender and ethnicity are bad for growth, democracy and social cohesion. Furthermore, globalisation, through the increased flow of information, the ICT revolution, contacts and tourism, is revealing more and more the inequality gaps and the unfairness of the existing global distribution. But do such inequalities matter for climate change and what are the relationships to the African countryside?The existence of inequalities is not contested, but their size may be and they are of different types. One analysis by Davies et al (UNU-Wider, 2006) concludes that the Gini value for global wealth is 89 percent, which could be illustrated by one person in a group of ten taking 99 percent of a pie and the other nine sharing the remaining 1 percent. Another analysis by Milanovic (World Bank, 2006) shows that each of the richest five percent earns in 48 hours as much as each of the five percent poorest does in a year. North America, Europe and high income Asia-Pacific together account for almost 90 percent of global wealth.
Whether globalisation and economic liberalisation increase inequalities or not is subject to discussion. The effect will, according to some, depend on the position of the populous countries at a point in time. Others claim that liberalisation tends to be followed by increases in inequality, but that the causality is doubtful. A globalisation model described by Kremer and Maskin (Harvard, 2006) assuming one rich and one poor country and only one consumption item, shows efficiency gains through cross-border production and that inequality increases or remains the same in the poor country. Outcomes depend on the assumption made and how the globalisation model is specified.
Although the Millennium Development Goals relate to ideas about global justice and human rights, they do not address distribution or inequality directly. Poor people are being left behind in spite of acceptable national aggregates. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest share of poverty, nearly 50 percent, and it is not decreasing. Rural people struggle for survival through expanding agriculture and diversifying incomes. Deforestation takes place in developing countries, mainly in Africa and parts of Asia. Globally 13 million ha of tropical forest are degraded or disappear annually. Agriculture and deforestation account for between 25 and 45 percent of the total green-house gas emissions (GHG), according to Watson et al. (IPCC, 2000). The major part comes from developing countries. African rural poverty, in a context of subsistence and survival, thus contributes considerably to GHG emissions.
By far the largest GHG source globally is energy. It accounts for more than 60 percent of total GHG emissions, of which about 80 percent occur in rich countries. In these countries, tourism is estimated to double by 2020 implying a massive increase in air traffic and GHG emissions. Likewise the production and consumption patterns among the rich in the rich and poor countries show no trends towards reduction of GHG emissions. The notion of delinking consumption in the north from poverty in the south is also spreading (for example ‘product Red’ campaigned for by global celebrities). The ways poverty, consumption and climate change are addressed, tend to blur historical, structural and power features underlying global inequalities. This allows for a focus on market forces, e.g. carbon trading, to resolve the problems. This will not suffice and at best delay a real solution which subsequently will have to be developed in a situation of more acute global social injustice and possibly deeper conflicts.
Bio-fuel colonisation of rural African lands
Rather than reducing global inequalities and resolving the problem of GHG emissions and climate change through reduction in use of fossil fuels at the source, a grand design has emerged to develop liquid bio-fuels, in particular ethanol and bio-diesel. The objective is to reduce fossil fuel consumption, in particular in the transport sector. The most determining aspect in bio-fuel production is the feed-stock factor, e.g. sugar cane, maize and oil seeds, which account for more than half the production cost. The expansion of bio-fuel production has driven up food prices, e.g. that of maize by two-thirds over the last two years. The competition between energy and food already constitutes a real conflict. However, no developed country, except Brazil, can enhance energy security from domestic feedstock crops, since only a small portion of the demand for transport fuels can be met. For example, within the EU, conversion of about 70 percent of agricultural land would only raise the share of bio-fuels in the domestic consumption of transport fuels to ten percent. First generation technologies, and in particular manual harvesting, such as in Brazil, also have serious health and environmental impacts. Development of bio-fuel in Africa is currently based on the experiences from Brazil and large and well-watered areas, in particular in river valleys, are being taken into use or requested by investors. Considerable interest in African production of bio-fuels for export has been shown by European companies and donors.
However, the net ‘climate outcomes’ of e.g. ethanol for bio-fuel are questionable. Firstly it is being developed in large scale commercial farming that often pushes smallholders off their land. This trend is likely to continue in Africa where smallholder land rights are weak. Secondly, sugar cane production will compete with the most fertile food producing areas. Thirdly, as long as the production of feedstock crops leads to deforestation, the contribution of bio-fuels to the reduction of GHG emissions is questionable. Extremely good growth conditions in many African settings may generate large volumes of low cost bio-fuels and investors show keen interest as long as they do not need to ‘take care of’ the social, health and ecological problems associated with large scale production. This may emerge as a role for donors and the pressure on European aid agencies in this direction already exists. The speed of bio-fuel production in rural Africa is leading to contestation over scarce land and the marginalisation of smallholders and livestock people – a new form of colonisation is emerging.
The argument that significant efficiency gains could result from reallocation of global production to low-cost producers, such as in Africa, does not fully account for the GHG impacts from long haul transports. High petroleum costs may, however, make bio-fuel production economically viable in some oil-importing countries, in particular land-locked, oil importing countries.
The role of donors and global governance
Issues related to inequality, energy and climate are of a global character – there is no longer one solution for the south and one for the north. Donor agencies have a particular south focus which does not allow for an understanding of the complexity of global issues. At the national level new institutions have to be formed for this purpose. Likewise institutions of learning and research have to be reorganised to address real and complex problems and issues. In addition global governance and agreements need to expand and become strengthened and include effective sanctions. Global taxation of the very rich in favour of the many very poor also has to be developed so that global inequality and injustice can be further addressed. Land rights of smallholders in rural Africa have to be strengthened in order to avoid bio-fuel colonisation leading to increased poverty and inequality with negative impacts on the climate.
Suggested reading
Davies, James, S. Sandström, A. Shorrocks and E. Wolff, The World Distribution of Household Wealth. UNU-Wider, 2006. Available online at http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/2006-2007/2006-2007-1/wider-wdhw-launch-5-12-2006/wider-wdhw-report-5-12-2006.pdf.
Kremer, Michael and E. Maskin, Globalization and Inequality. Harvard, 2006. Available online at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/papers.html.
Milanovic, Branko, Global income inequality: what it is and why it matters. The World Bank, 2006. Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 3865.
OECD, Climate Policy Uncertainty and Investment Risk. OECD, 2007.
Watson, Robert et al (eds), Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry: A Special Report of the IPCC. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)/ Cambridge University Press, 2000.
the author
Kjell Havnevik is Senior researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute.